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ABSTRACT
Supporting Large Scale Communication Systems on Infrastructureless Networks Composed
of Commodity Mobile Devices: Practicality, Scalability, and Security
by
Yue Liu
Chair: Robert P. Dick
Infrastructureless Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) composed of commodity mobile devices
have the potential to support communication applications resistant to blocking and censor-
ship, as well as certain types of surveillance. In this thesis we study the utility, practicality,
robustness, and security of using these networks to provide useful and censorship-resistant
communication services to local communities.
We collected two sets of wireless connectivity traces of commodity mobile devices with
different granularity and scales for this study. The first dataset is collected through active
installation of measurement software on volunteer users’ personally owned smartphones.
We implemented and deployed a prototype DTN microblogging application, called 1am, in
the University of Michigan campus, and collected traces during a time period with 111 users.
The second dataset is collected through passive observation of WiFi association events. It
involves all 119,055 mobile devices recorded on the U-M campus WiFi network for a month.
Despite their differences in granularity and scales, simulation results show highly con-
sistent message delivery performances of the two networks. Using an epidemic flooding
protocol, the large network achieves an average delivery rate of 0.71 in 24 hours and 0.95
in 72 hours, with a median delivery delay of 10.9 hours. The small network achieves an
average delivery rate of 0.7 in 24 hours and 0.8 in 72 hours, with a median delivery delay of
13 hours. We show that this performance is appropriate for sharing information that is not
time sensitive, e.g., blogs and photos. Based on a measurement-based energy model, we
also show that using an energy efficient variant of the epidemic flooding protocol, even the
large network with 119,055 devices can support text messages while only consuming 13.7%
of a typical smartphone battery in 14 hours.
xi
We found that the network delivery rate and delay are robust to denial-of-service and
censorship attacks. Attacks that randomly remove 90% of the network participants only
reduce delivery rates to the remaining participants by less than 10%. Even when subjected
to targeted attacks, the network suffered a less than 10% decrease in delivery rate when 40%
of its participants were removed, and starts to break down only after 60% of the participants
were removed.
In order to allow connectivity trace collection through active installation of measurement
software, we developed a software platform to facilitate large-scale deployment-based
studies of DTN protocols and applications on commodity mobile devices, named MANES.
MANES provides an integrated, software-based framework that allows convenient control,
observation, and logging of DTN communication and connectivity data during deployments.
By providing emulated 802.11 ad hoc communications on commodity devices, MANES
supports crowdsourcing deployments among common users without rooting their devices.
Although structurally robust, the openness of the proposed network introduces numerous
security concerns since participants are not vetted. Ensuring security is further complicated
because the system is distributed, without any central point of trust. The Sybil attack, in
which a malicious node poses as many identities in order to gain disproportionate influence,
is especially dangerous to distributed systems as it breaks the assumption underlying majority
voting. Many defenses based on spatial variability of wireless channels exist, and we extend
them to be practical for wireless ad hoc networks of commodity 802.11 devices without
mutual trust. Specifically, we propose two efficient methods for separating valid channel
measurement results of behaving nodes from those falsified by malicious participants.
We present the Mason test, the first implementation of these techniques for ad hoc and
delay-tolerant networks of commodity 802.11 devices.
xii
CHAPTER I
Introduction
The Internet was once credited with promoting information sharing and access by
connecting every corner of our planet. Yet, it can be used to facilitate surveillance and
censorship at an unprecedented scale and granularity, undermining privacy and freedom of
speech. With the knowledge of their customers, Internet giants like Google and Amazon
monitor and record online activities for commercial purposes. Unauthorized mass informa-
tion acquisition is also common. There is evidence that the NSA has continued engaging in
"overcollection" of domestic communications since 9/11 [3, 4, 5].
In recent years, Internet censorship has been exercised with increasing frequency. During
the Arab Spring, social media services such as Twitter and Facebook were intentionally
blocked to quell protests [6]. In an extreme case, Internet service in Egypt was completely
shut down for days in February 2011 [7]. These incidents are not singular. In 2012/2013
Reporters Without Borders has named 26 countries and 5 corporations conducting content
filtering on the Internet via cyber attacks, or by pressuring technical service providers [8, 9].
We attribute the Internet’s high vulnerability to surveillance and censorship to its hi-
erarchical structure. Various research has shown that the connectivity graph of Internet
routers is scale-free [10, 11]. The Internet becomes fragmented when less than 5% of its
most connected routers are removed [12]. The same imbalance in traffic distribution is also
observed in Internet applications. For example, in 2014, Google, Microsoft Bing, and Yahoo
in total served 96.4% of all the search traffic in the U.S. [13] Because backbone routers and
servers are usually owned by the government or a few large corporations, it is comparatively
easy for powerful entities to gain access and control.
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1.1 Censorship- and Surveillance-Resistant Techniques on the Inter-
net
Security researchers and practitioners have designed many protocols and tools to protect
privacy on the Internet, and to increase the cost of surveillance and censorship. Encryption
is used across multiple layers of the TCP/IP network to protect the confidentiality and
privacy of communications. Internet Protocol Security protects the confidentiality and
authenticity of IP packets between network routers [14]. Transport Layer Security provides
end-to-end encryption of traffic streams between application entities, e.g., between HTTP
clients and servers [15]. In the application layer, tools like GnuPG [16], Off-The-Record
Messaging [17], Silent Text [18], and Cryptocat [19] support confidential communication
between end users.
Eventually, the security of encryption solutions depends on the security of their un-
derlying key exchange/storage schemes, as whoever possesses the key gains access to the
information. Any system that relies on a single third party for key distribution, e.g., a host
server or a public key infrastructure, is vulnerable to attacks on that party. For example,
Hushmail broke its promise to secure its clients’ keys under the pressure of a court or-
der [20]. DigiNotar, a trusted certificate authority in Netherlands, issued more than 500 false
certificates in an attack in 2011 that caused more than 300,000 Iranian IP addresses to be
compromised [21]. Decentralized key distribution schemes that rely on the web of trust, e.g.,
PGP [22], or manual verification between the two parties, e.g., voice-based verification, are
more secure. Unfortunately, these systems are never popular because they are hard to use.
Anonymity techniques further protect communication metadata, i.e., the identities of
involved parties. For example, Tor is a widely used tool to anonymize TCP streams via onion
routing [23]. This technique is useful in combating censorship; seemingly benign traffic
to uncensored proxies can be redirected to their real destinations, e.g., censored websites
hosted outside the restricted region. Anonymous peer-to-peer file sharing techniques, e.g.,
Freenet [24] and RetroShare [25], are also useful in circumventing censorship. It is important
to note that the degree of anonymity eventually depends on how large the suspect pool is.
For example, the student who sent anonymous email bomb threat to Harvard University via
Tor was quickly identified, not because of Tor’s failure, but because the total number of Tor
visitors in Harvard that day was probably very small [26].
An important lesson learned from reviewing these techniques is security solutions that
put all trust on single parties are vulnerable and decentralized systems are more secure in
face of attacks or coercion. With this observation, we push the effort of decentralization to an
even lower level, the communication network itself. We move from the traditional Internet,
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which is highly centralized, and explore the idea of using a fully decentralized network
composed of people’s own computing devices for secure, private, and censorship-resistant
communication.
1.2 Infrastructureless Networks for Censorship and Surveillance Re-
sistant Communication
With the commoditization of computers and wireless technology in recent years, re-
searchers and practitioners have started to explore the idea of providing censorship- and
surveillance-resistant communication through distributed, self-organizing wireless networks
composed of participants’ own devices [27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. The basic idea is to remove
reliance on Internet infrastructure that is controlled by a very small group of companies and
governments, and instead organize the computation and communication resources of the
general public into an open, available, and robust communication network. It is difficult
to monitor, access, or control traffic flows in this network as it requires controlling a large
portion of the participating devices owned by the general public; it is expensive to do so.
One particular class of infrastructureless networks caught our attention, the so-called
Pocket Switched Networks (PSNs), which are composed of people’s own mobile devices,
e.g., smartphones, tablets, and laptops [32, 33, 30]. Devices on these networks use their
existing short range wireless modules, e.g., 802.11 ad hoc or BlueTooth, to exchange
information upon contact. These networks have one distinct advantage: there is little
economic or technical threshold to join. Anyone with a smartphone can participate by
simply installing a software. As a result, their potential users are the whole pool of ever
growing smartphone/laptop users who are eager to try out new technologies. In fact, during
Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution, the overnight success of Firechat, a smartphone app
that uses PSNs to provide communication in the face of Internet failures [30], showed the
interest in such networks. The application was downloaded 200,000 times between 28 and
30 September 2014 in response to the threat of potential denial of service attacks on the
Internet-based Instagram [34].
For their practicality, we envision using PSNs to serve the communication needs of
a local community such as a town or a university campus. The ultimate goal is to build
an end-to-end solution to provide secure, private, and censorship-resistant communication
services. As a first step towards this goal, a main focus of this thesis is enhancing our
understanding of the performance and capacity of PSNs, especially when serving a whole
community with hundreds of thousands of users. As PSNs are a class of Mobile Ad hoc and
Delay Tolerant Networks, we will spend Section 2.3 to review related work. In Section 1.4
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we go into more details on the specific problems with studying large-scale PSNs.
1.3 MANET and DTN Background
The concept of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) emerged in the 1970s to describe
infrastructureless wireless networks composed of mobile nodes, which are featured by
continuous topology changes due to node mobility [35]. MANETs assume end-to-end con-
nectivity between network nodes. On the other hand, Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs), also
referred to as Disruption Tolerant Networks, do not assume continuous network connectivity.
The concept was first developed for deep-space communication, and later expanded to de-
scribe any infrastructureless networks with “limited expectations of end-to-end connectivity
and node resources” [36]. The Pocket Switched Networks we work with, those composed
of handheld devices equipped with commodity short-range radios, e.g., 802.11 ad hoc and
Bluetooth, are best modeled by DTNs, because end-to-end connectivity is not guaranteed
and human mobility has a large impact on the propagation of messages in these networks.
We will use PSNs and DTNs interchangeably in the rest of this thesis.
Routing is the most fundamental problem of DTNs and previous research has made
significant progress. Mayer classifies DTN routing protocols into three categories based
on how forwarding decisions are made [37]. Destination-aware protocols use routing
information, possibly containing indirect node encounters, to construct paths with highest
delivery probability to the destination, e.g., PROPHET [38]. Self-aware protocols use only
local information, e.g., each candidate’s number of contacts, to make forwarding decisions
independent of the destination, e.g., SimBet [39] and BUBBLE Rap [33]. Unaware protocols
make no evaluation of candidate next-hops and simply forward messages to anyone in
contact, e.g., epidemic flooding [40]. Our solutions build upon these existing routing
protocols.
In the last decade with the emergence of high-performance mobile computing devices,
e.g., handhold devices and laptops, the idea of connecting these devices into DTNs has
gained increasing interest from the research community [32, 41, 42, 33, 43]. The main
application scenario envisioned is to complement infrastructure wireless networks. Under-
standing human mobility and contact patterns is critical to understanding such networks.
Towards this end, various deployments have been conducted and the collected human
contact traces—either Bluetooth contacts [32, 44], or estimated contacts based on WiFi
association records [45, 46], or course schedules [47]—shared with the research community.
Researchers have found that human proximity networks closely resemble social networks
with their small-world, community-based structures [48, 49, 50, 51, 33]. These new dis-
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coveries have guided researchers to design more efficient routing protocols [39, 33] and
applications [52].
1.4 Practicality and Scalability of PSNs
The application scenario we envision is a large-scale PSN that serves the communication
needs of a local community, e.g., a small town or a university campus. Information,
knowledge, and ideas that would otherwise be censored on the Internet are free to flow on
this network. It is not the small scale ad hoc network for multi-player gaming or connecting
to nearby printers that we commonly encounter. A communication system like this needs
hundreds of thousands of users to survive and thrive. Therefore, it should be designed to
support large numbers of users, e.g., a substantial percent of a town or a campus.
Due to the difficulty of collecting large-scale human mobility and contact traces, little
is known about the performance and behavior of large-scale PSNs. In particular, we are
interested in three basic questions concerning their practicality and scalability. First, what is
the message delivery performance in terms of delivery rates and delay? Second, what is the
overhead for each participant to support such a network? Third, how does this network react
to changing adoption rate and random or intentional node failures?
Existing work mainly uses mathematical models to understand large-scale DTNs, most
based on Markov chains [53, 41, 54] or fluid approximations [55, 56]. For analytical
tractability, Poisson processes are used to model the contacts of node pairs and all pairs
are assumed to follow independent and identical Poisson processes with the same contact
rate [53]. Measurement results with real human contact traces contradict these assumptions.
Inter-contact times are shown to follow power-law distributions [41, 57], contradicting the
Poisson process assumption. Also, as shown in Chapter IV, different node pairs have very
different contact rates.
We choose to study large-scale PSNs using real human mobility and contact traces. It is
a non-trivial undertaking to collect large-scale human contact traces. There are various large-
scale mobility traces generated from phone records [58] or smartphone application data [59],
for example. However, their granularity is too coarse to infer direct contacts that are within
802.11 ad hoc or BlueTooth communication ranges. On the other hand, various human
contact traces exist, but their scales are small, often a few hundred nodes [32, 44, 45, 46, 47].
The largest one we are aware of includes around 22,000 students on a university campus [47].
However, the contacts were derived from course schedules and therefore lack important
details of the contact patterns. In addition, this dataset does not include contacts outside of
classrooms, e.g., those in public libraries.
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We used two methods to collect human contact traces. Both derived contacts based on
WiFi association records. In the first case, we recruited volunteers to install study software
on their smartphones. The number of participants was limited: 111. However, since the
measurement software was installed on participants’ personal smartphones, we were able to
obtain a full history of their mobility and contacts (see Chapter IV). For the data collection
we implemented a deployment and trace collection platform for MANET and DTN protocols,
in hope of reducing overheads for deployment-based studies (see Chapter III).
In the second case, we passively monitored a university’s campus WiFi network and
obtaining all association/disassociation histories from the WiFi network controllers. This
is the same method used in collecting the Dartmouth traces [45]. We recorded 119,055
mobile devices, nearly twice the campus population, indicating high coverage ratio of the
population. These traces allows us to answer the original question on the performance and
overhead of a very large-scale PSN (see Chapter IV). Note that this method is not able to
record contact opportunities outside of the campus.
In addition to measuring and characterizing basic network performance, we also look
into security problems on PSNs. We study how they react to random and targeted node
failures using trace-driven simulations. We also look into one specific attack, the Sybil
attack, which is particularly harmful in distributed systems. We design a practical Sybil
defense that works with a completely distributed trust model (see Chapter II).
Our measurement studies on large-scale DTNs composed of commodity wireless devices
show that these networks could deliver messages within a few hours to one or two days,
and are therefore able to serve applications whose information is not time sensitive, e.g.,
photo sharing and weblogs. We also find that the energy overhead for participating in these
networks is acceptable, e.g., supporting text messages consumes about 14% of a typical
smartphone battery in 14 hours. On the other hand, we have shown that these networks are
robust to random node failures and intentional censorship or blocking attacks; even in the
worst attacks more than 40% of network nodes have to be eliminated to noticeably degrade
the network performance. Our work in Chapter II further proves that it is possible to design
complicated security protocols on these networks with a completely distributed trust model.
To summarize, we make the following statement according to findings of this thesis.
Thesis Statement: It is practical to use infrastructureless networks composed of commodity
handheld devices to serve local communities (of hundreds of thousands of people)
with secure and censorship-resistant communication applications that could tolerate
comparatively longer delays, e.g., blogs and photo sharing.
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1.5 Dissertation Outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter II, we propose a practical solution to a common security problem in distributed
wireless networks, the Sybil attack, in which a malicious node poses as many identities
in order to gain disproportionate influence. Many defenses based on spatial variability
of wireless channels exist, but depend either on detailed, multi-tap channel estimation—
something not exposed on commodity 802.11 devices—or valid RSSI observations from
multiple trusted sources, e.g., corporate access points—something not directly available
in ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks with potentially malicious neighbors. We extend
these techniques to be practical for wireless ad hoc networks of commodity 802.11 devices.
Specifically, we propose two efficient methods for separating the valid RSSI observations
of compliant nodes from those falsified by malicious participants. Further, we note that
prior signalprint methods are easily defeated by mobile attackers and develop an appropriate
challenge-response defense. Finally, we present the Mason test, the first implementation of
these techniques for ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks of commodity 802.11 devices. We
illustrate its performance in several real-world scenarios.
In Chapter III, we describe MANES, an emulation system for MANETs and DTNs com-
posed of commodity mobile devices such as smartphones. Despite the increasing popularity
of mobile computing devices, designing MANETs and/or DTNs applications and protocols
that work under realistic conditions remains challenging because it is difficult and expensive
to do large-scale deployment-based studies. MANES provides an integrated, software-based
framework that allows convenient control, observation, and logging of communication data
during deployments. By providing emulated 802.11 ad hoc communications on commodity
devices, MANES supports crowdsourcing deployments with common users.
Chapter IV describes in detail the two sets of wireless connectivity traces of commodity
mobile devices that we collected, including the collection methodology and basic statistics.
We attempted two methods to collect fine granularity, large scale mobile device connectivity
traces. The first method is active installation of measurement software on volunteer users’
personally owned smartphones. We developed and deployed a prototype microblogging
application on Android, named 1am [60]. 1am had 291 users, with 111 users during a month
of high activity on which our analysis focuses. We call this dataset “the 1am dataset”. The
second method is passive collection of WiFi association records, and infer direct 802.11
contacts using the following heuristics; two devices associated with the same access point
simultaneously are considered in contact. We collected the contact traces of all 119,055
mobile devices recorded by the U-M campus WiFi network for a month. We call this dataset
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“the U-M dataset”.
In Chapter V we report measurement results of message delivery performance, energy
overhead, and robustness to resource removal and censorship attacks for the two datasets.
Despite their differences in granularity and scales, networks in the two datasets show similar
performances. For example, the U-M network achieves an average delivery rate of 0.95 in
72 hours (0.71 in 24 hours) and a median delivery delay of 10.9 hours. The 1am network
achieves an average delivery rate of 0.7 in 24 hours and 0.8 in 72 hours, with a median
delivery delay of 13 hours. We show that using an energy efficient variant of the epidemic
flooding protocol, the U-M network could support text messages with only consuming
13.7% of a typical smartphone battery in 14 hours.
Finally, we conclude the thesis with discussions on our discoveries and implications for
future work in Chapter VI.
1.6 Contributions
We make the following contributions in this thesis.
• We design two methods of O(n3) complexity to separate true and false RSSI ob-
servations, enabling signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks of nodes
without mutual trust. The first method gives partial separation, bounding the number
of misclassified identities. The second provides full separation, but works only when
conforming nodes outnumber physical attacking nodes.
• We develop a challenge-response protocol to detect attackers attempting to use motion
to defeat the signalprint-based Sybil defense.
• We describe the Mason test, a practical protocol for Sybil defense based on these
ideas. We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module for 802.11 ad hoc
networks and characterize its performance in real-world scenarios.
• We describe the design and implementation of MANES, a low-overhead, software
based solution that facilitates experimental deployment to evaluate MANET and DTN
protocols and applications using commodity mobile devices.
• We present a new technique to predict pairwise 802.11 connectivities using environ-
mental Wi-Fi scan results. We show that this prediction technique yields significantly
more accurate results than the widely used shared access point heuristic, according to
an experimental evaluation with 17 users for more than 2,000 hours.
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• We construct a connectivity graph of human location proximity involving 119,055
mobile devices on a university campus from their WiFi association histories for a
month. We study basic properties of this human contact graph, reporting significantly
higher node degrees (2863), shorter path lengths (2.3), and higher cluster coefficient
(0.357) than popular online social networks. We show that its degree distribution
has an exponential, instead of power-law tail. We also report that the human contact
network shows strong “assortative mixing”.
• Our analysis indicates that in a college town in which 0.2% of the population install a
DTN app, the system has a median delivery rate of 0.85 after 72 hours and a median
delivery delay of 13 hours. When all 119,055 mobile devices are involved, the campus-
wide DTN achieves a message delivery rate of 0.71 after 24 hours, and 0.95 after
72 hours. The median delivery delay is 10.9 hours. We pay special attention to the
system’s performance variations and study their causes.
• We found that the delivery delays of DTN flooding protocols follow a power law
distribution that varies from hours to days. We compare the distribution of the
network’s message delivery delays with the distributions of user response delays
of various popular online applications, and show that this campus-wide DTN is
appropriate for sharing non-time sensitive information such as Flickr photos and
weblog articles.
• Robustness to denial-of-service and censorship attacks: We found that attacks that
randomly remove 90% of the network participants only reduce delivery rates to the
remaining participants by less than 10%. Targeted attacks, which remove nodes
that have most contacts, were more harmful, causing the delivery rate to decrease
precipitously when half of the participants were removed. However, even when
subjected to targeted attacks, the network only suffered a less than 10% decrease in
delivery rate when 40% of its participants were removed.
• We analyzed the impact of participating in large scale DTNs (119,055 nodes) on
smartphone battery lifespan. Based on a measurement-based wireless communication
aware smartphone power consumption model, our analysis shows that supporting
text messages using a naive epidemic flooding protocol consumes 87.5% of a typical
smartphone battery in 14 hours. We show that an energy efficient variant of the
epidemic flooding protocol has around 10X decrease in energy consumption, while
keeping comparable message delivery performance. Supporting text messages using
this protocol consumes 13.7% of a typical smartphone battery in 14 hours.
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CHAPTER II
The Mason Test: A Defense Against Sybil Attacks in
Wireless Networks Without Trusted Authorities
2.1 Introduction
The open nature of wireless ad hoc networks (including delay-tolerant networks [33])
enables applications ranging from collaborative environmental sensing [61] to emergency
communication [62], but introduces numerous security concerns since participants are not
vetted. Solutions generally rely on a majority of the participants following a particular
protocol, an assumption that often holds because physical nodes are expensive. However,
this assumption is easily broken by a Sybil attack. A single physical entity can pretend to be
multiple participants, gaining unfair influence at low cost [63]. Newsome et al. survey Sybil
attacks against various protocols [64], illustrating the need for a practical defense.
Proposed defenses (see Levine et al. for a survey [65]) fall into two categories. Trusted
certification methods [66, 67] use a central authority to vet potential participants and thus
are not useful in open ad hoc (and delay-tolerant) networks. Resource testing methods [68,
69, 70, 71] verify the resources (e.g., computing capability, storage capacity, real-world
social relationships, etc.) of each physical entity. Most are easily defeated in ad hoc
networks of resource-limited mobile devices by attackers with access to greater resources,
e.g., workstations or data centers.
One useful class of defenses is based on the natural spatial variation in the wireless
propagation channel, an implicit resource. Channel responses are uncorrelated over distances
greater than half the transmission wavelength [72] (6 cm for 2.4 GHz 802.11), so two
transmissions with the same channel response are very likely to be from the same location
and device [73, 1]. Note that two transmitters may be close enough, i.e., ∼6 cm, to produce
the same channel response, but this case is rare in practice.1 One class of Sybil defenses
1In our experiments with smartphone users, distinct transmitters displayed similar channel responses in
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Figure 2.1: Prior work [1, 2] assumes trusted RSSI observations, which are not generally
available in ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks. We present a technique for a participant to
separate true and false observations, enabling use in ad hoc networks. Arrows point from
transmitter to observer.
based on this observation uses specialized hardware to accurately measure and compare
channel responses [1]. However commodity devices are not equipped with such hardware.
Commodity devices expose an aggregate, scalar value, the received signal strength.
RSSI can be changed by varying transmit power, so a vector of observations from multiple
receivers—a signalprint—is used instead, as its direction stays unchanged. Several authors
have proposed such methods [2, 74, 75, 76] assuming trusted, true observations from, for
example, access points (Figure 2.1a). In open ad hoc networks, observations are untrusted,
coming from potentially lying neighbors (Figure 2.1b). In this case observations falsified
by attackers can lead to incorrect conclusions (Figure 2.1c). Trust-less methods have been
proposed, but have various limitations (e.g., devices must have uniform transmit power [77]
or the method may be used only in outdoor environments with predictable propagation
ranges [78]). Instead, a general method to separate true and false observations is needed.
We observe that, with high probability, attackers cannot produce false observations that
make conforming identities look Sybil, due to the unpredictability of wireless channels.
We exploit this weakness to bound the number of misclassified identities. In cases where
conforming nodes outnumber physical attacking nodes (a major motivating factor for the
Sybil attack), we develop a notion of consistency that enables fully accurate classification.
Signalprint-based detection is easily defeated by nodes that change locations to pro-
fewer than 0.01% of cases (see Figure 2.15 in Section 2.9).
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duce multiple signalprints. Most past work ignores this problem, assuming that all nodes,
including attackers, remain stationary. Although reasonable for conforming nodes, e.g.,
most human-carried smartphones are stationary over short time-spans, this is too strong an
assumption for attackers. We remove this restriction on the attack model and defeat moving
attacks by detecting and rejecting moving nodes. The rejection is temporary. Nodes can be
tested again once stationary.
To detect moving attackers, Xiao et al. noted that successive transmissions from the
same stationary node should have the same signalprint, while attackers cannot quickly (i.e.,
in milliseconds) switch between precise positions and therefore have inconsistent signal-
prints [1]. They did not further develop or evaluate a method making use of this observation.
We develop a challenge–response protocol from this idea and study its performance on real
deployments.
At a high level, we seek to allow a wireless network participant to occasionally determine
which of its one-hop neighbors are non-Sybil. Verified non-Sybil participants, uniquely
identified by their public keys, may safely participate in other protocols. In mobile networks,
the process must be repeated occasionally (e.g., once per hour) as the neighbors change.
Safety is more important than system performance, so nearly all Sybil identities must be
detected. In most applications, it is acceptable for some non-Sybils to be rejected, e.g., any
that were moving during the test.
We make the following primary contributions.
• We design two methods of O(n3) complexity to separate true and false RSSI ob-
servations, enabling signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks of nodes
without mutual trust. The first method gives partial separation, bounding the number
of misclassified identities. The second provides full separation, but works only when
conforming nodes outnumber physical attacking nodes.
• We prove conditions under which a participant can fully separate true and false
observations.
• We develop a challenge-response protocol to detect attackers attempting to use motion
to defeat the signalprint-based Sybil defense.
• We describe the Mason test, a practical protocol for Sybil defense based on these
ideas. We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module for 802.11 ad hoc
networks and characterize its performance in real-world scenarios.
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2.2 Related Work
Many Sybil defense techniques are built on resource testing of wireless channels, because
placing transmitters in many locations is much more difficult than acquiring additional
computation or memory resources. Xiao et al. observe that in OFDM-based 802.11 channels,
the coherence bandwidth is much smaller than the system bandwidth and thus the channel
response estimates at well-spaced frequency taps are uncorrelated, forming a vector unique
to the transmitter location and robust to changes in transmitter power [1].
Li et al. use the unique mapping between identity and wireless channel to develop a
channel-based authentication scheme, using both pulse-type probing in the time domain
and multi-tone probing in the frequency domain for channel estimation [79]. Although not
originally designed for Sybil defense, applying this technique to detect multiple identities
sharing the same channel is straightforward. A primary drawback of this class of work is its
restriction to specialized hardware or firmware, as commodity 802.11 devices do not expose
detailed channel information to the driver and operating system.
Faria et al. and Demirbas et al. independently developed the signalprint technique, which
greatly simplifies channel estimations while maintaining high Sybil detection performance [2,
74]. Instead of measuring probe responses, a vector of RSSIs reported by multiple receivers
at different locations is used to characterize the sender’s unique location and wireless
environment.
This class of work [2, 74, 75, 76] has two disadvantages. First it relies on trusted
external measurements, e.g., RSSIs from trusted 802.11 access points, which are generally
unavailable in open ad hoc networks. Our work builds on their ideas, but does not rely on
any particular external device being trustworthy. Second, it restricts the attack model to
stationary devices, even though attackers can easily use mobile devices. Our work detects
and rejects moving nodes, instead of accepting them as non-Sybil.
Lv et al. developed a method based on one-dimensional signalprints, which therefore
does not rely on any external measurements [77]. However, it assumes, unrealistically, a
uniform transmit power for all devices, including attacking devices.
Bouassida et al. developed a trust-less method for vehicular area networks. Instead
of relying on external measurements, the verifier obtains uncorrelated measurements by
changing its own reception locations. These measurements are used to locate the transmitter
and detect abnormalities. It also rejects moving nodes with significant location changes over
multiple measurements [78]. However, this technique relies on a predictable propagation
model for location estimation that fails to capture the notorious variations of wireless
channels. Our method does not assume any propagation model. Instead, we rely on the
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Figure 2.2: The solution framework for signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks.
In this work we flesh out this concept into a safe and secure protocol, the Mason test.
unpredictability of wireless signal propagation to defeat lying attackers.
2.3 Problem Formulation and Background
In this section, we define our problem, summarize the solution framework, describe our
attack model, and briefly review the signalprint method.
2.3.1 Problem Formulation
Our goal is to extend signalprint-based Sybil detection methods to work without a priori
trust in any observer, allowing any participant in an open wireless network to determine
which of its one-hop neighbors are non-Sybil. The solution framework is illustrated in
Figure 2.2 with five participants. We assume an arbitrary identity (or condition) starts the
process. Participants first take turns broadcasting probe packets while all others record the
observed RSSIs (Figure 2.2a). These observations are then shared, although malicious nodes
may lie. Figure 2.2b shows every participant after this exchange, with observations from all
five participants. Finally each participant individually selects a (hopefully truthful) subset of
observers for signalprint-based Sybil classification (Figure 2.2c).
In this work we present our method for truthful subset selection and flesh out this
framework into a usable, safe, and secure protocol. As with any system intended for real-
world use, we had to carefully balance system complexity and potential security weaknesses.
Section 2.10 discusses these choices and related potential concerns.
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2.3.2 Attack Model
We model attackers who operate commodity devices, but not specialized hardware.
Commodity devices can be obtained, at a large scale, by compromising those owned by
normal network participants, a more practical attack vector than distributing specialized
hardware at the same scale. Specifically, we assume attackers have the following capabilities
and restrictions.
1. Attackers may collude through arbitrary side channels.
2. Attackers may accumulate information, e.g., RSSIs, across multiple rounds of the
Mason test.
3. Attackers have limited ability to predict the RSSI observations of other nodes, e.g.,
7 dBm uncertainty (see Section 2.6), precluding fine-grained pre-characterization.
4. Attackers can control transmit power for each packet, but not precisely or quickly steer
the output in a desired direction, i.e., they are not equipped for antenna array-based
beam-forming.
5. Attackers can move their devices, but cannot quickly and precisely switch them
between multiple positions, e.g., they do not have high-speed, automated electrome-
chanical control.
One common denial-of-service (DOS) attack in wireless networks, i.e., jamming the
channel, cannot be defended against by commodity devices. Thus, we do not defend against
other more-complicated DOS attacks. However, note that ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks
are much more resistant than infrastructure networks to such attacks, because a single attack
can affect only a small portion of the network. Moreover, DOS attacks are less catastrophic
to privacy and security than successful Sybil attacks.
Notably, we assume attackers do not have per-antenna control of MIMO (Multiple-
Input and Multiple-Output) [80] devices. Such control would defeat the signalprint method
(even with trusted observers), but is costly to implement. Commodity MIMO devices (e.g.,
802.11n adapters) do not expose this control to software and thus are not suitable attack
vectors. Distributing specialized MIMO-capable hardware over large portions of the network
would be prohibitively expensive.
We believe that the signalprint method can be extended to MIMO systems (see Ap-
pendix A for a proposed solution and its theoretical proof), but doing so is beyond the
scope of this work. Our focus is extending signalprint-based methods to ad hoc networks of
commodity devices by removing the requirement for trusted observations.
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2.3.3 Review of Signalprints
We briefly review the signalprint method. See prior work for details [1, 74]. A signalprint
is a vector of RSSIs at multiple observers for a single transmission. Ignoring noise, the
vector of received powers (in logarithmic units, e.g., dBm) at multiple receivers for a given
transmission can be modeled [72] as ~s = ~h + p~1, where p is the transmit power and ~h
is the attenuation vector, a function of the channel amplitude response and the receiver
characteristics. Transmissions from different locations have uncorrelated signalprints, as the
channel responses are likely uncorrelated. Those from the same location, however, share
a channel response and will be correlated. That is, for two transmissions a and b from the
same location with transmit powers pa and pb = pa + c, the signalprints ~sb = ~h + pa~1 and
~sb = ~h + (pa + c)~1 are related as ~sb = ~sa + c~1. In other words, all observers see the same
RSSI difference c for the two transmissions.
This is illustrated geometrically in Figure 2.3 for a two-receiver signalprint. A and B
are Sybil, while C is not. D and E are also Sybil, but due to noise the signalprints are not
perfectly correlated. Instead, signalprints on lines closer than some threshold are taken to be
Sybil.
Definition. The signalprint distance d(~sa,~sb) between two signalprints ~sa and ~sb is the
perpendicular distance between the slope-1 lines containing them. Letting
~w , ~sa −~sb
be the distance vector between the signalprints and
~v⊥ , ~w − ~w ·
~1
‖~1‖2
~1
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be the vector rejection of ~w from ~1, then
d(~sa,~sb) = ‖~v⊥‖.
Figure 2.4 shows the distance distributions for Sybil and non-Sybil identities using
measurement data for commodity Android devices.2 The two distributions are well separated
with small overlap, so the choice of classification threshold trades false positives for false
negatives. A good threshold supports detection of at least 99.9% of Sybils while accepting
at least 95% of non-Sybils, as reported by previous research [1, 74] and confirmed by our
own measurement (see Figure 2.13).
2.4 Sybil Classification From Untrusted Signalprints
In this section we describe two methods to detect Sybil identities using untrusted RSSI
observations. In both cases, a set of candidate views containing the true view (with high
probability) is generated. The accepted view is chosen by a view selection policy. The first
method selects the view indicting the most Sybils, limiting the total number of incorrect
classifications. The second selects the true view, but works only when conforming nodes
outnumber physical attacker nodes.
2.4.1 The Limited Power of Falsified Observations
Our key observation is that falsified RSSI observations have limited power. Although
falsifying observations to make Sybil identities look non-Sybil is easy, it is extremely
difficult to make a non-Sybil look Sybil. To see this, recall that a pair of identities is
considered Sybil only if all observers, including the initiator itself, report the same RSSI
difference for the pair’s transmissions. Making true Sybils appear non-Sybil is easy, because
randomly chosen values almost certainly fail to match the difference observed by the initiator.
Making a non-Sybil look Sybil, however, requires learning the difference observed by the
initiator, which is kept secret. Guessing is difficult due to the unpredictability of the wireless
channels. Our methods rely on this difficulty. They are developed formally in the rest of
this section. Quantitative characterizations are described in Section 2.6. To summarize, the
success probability for a guessing attacker is less than 10−6 in common situations, e.g., when
conforming nodes outnumber physical attackers by more than 1.53× (see Figure 2.8).
2We used size-4 signalprints from the “Outdoor” experiment in Section 2.9.
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2.4.2 Terminology
Table 2.1 lists all the terms and symbols used in the development of the classification
methods. I is the set of participating identities. Each is either Sybil or non-Sybil and reports
either true or false3 RSSI observations, partitioning the identities by their Sybilness (sets S
and NS) and the veracity of their reported observations (sets T and L).
LS LNS
TS C
S NS
L
T
Truthtelling, non-Sybil identities are called conforming (set C). Liars and Sybil identities are
called attacking (sets LS, LNS, and TS). Our goal is to distinguish the S and NS partitions
using the reported RSSI observations without first knowing the L and T partitions.
Definition. An initiator is the node performing Sybil classification.4 It trusts its own RSSI
observations, but no others.
Definition. A receiver set, denoted by R, is a subset of identities (R ⊆ I) whose reported
RSSI observations, combined with the initiator’s, form signalprints. Those with liars
(R ∩ L , ∅) produce incorrect classifications and those with only truthtellers (R ⊆ T )
produce the correct classification.
3A reported RSSI observation is considered false if some signalprints containing it misclassify some
identities.
4All participants perform classification individually, so each is the initiator in its own classification session.
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Definition. A view, denoted by V , is a classification of identities as Sybil and non-Sybil.
Those classified as Sybil (non-Sybil) are said to be Sybil (non-Sybil) under V and are
denoted by the subset VS (VNS). A view V obtained from the signalprints of a receiver set
R is generated by R, denoted by R 7→ V (read: R generates V), and can be written V(R).
Identities in R are considered non-Sybil, i.e., R ⊆ VNS(R). A true view, denoted by V ,
correctly labels all identities, i.e., VS = S and VNS = NS. Similarly, a false view, denoted by
V̂ , incorrectly labels some identities, i.e., V̂S , S and V̂NS , NS.
Definition. Incorrectly labeling non-Sybil identities as Sybil is called collapsing.
Assumption. To clearly illustrate the impact of intentionally falsified observations, we first
assume that true RSSI observations are noise-free and thus always generate the true view.
In Section 2.4.7, we extend the method to handle real-world observations containing, for
example, random noise and discretization error.
2.4.3 Approach Overview
A general separation method does not exist, because different scenarios can lead to
the same reported RSSI observations. To illustrate, consider identities I = {A|B} reporting
observations such that
R ⊆ A 7→ V1 = {V1NS = A|V1S = B} and
R ⊆ B 7→ V2 = {V2NS = B|V2S = A}
and two different scenarios x and y such that
in x, {T x = A|Lx = B} = I and
in y, {T y = B|Ly = A} = I.
R ⊆ T 7→ V , so V1 and V2 are both true views, the former in scenario x and the latter in
scenario y. In other words, identities in A could be Sybil (as claimed by B) or those in B
could be Sybil (as claimed by A). Either view could be correct; it depends on which group
is lying. Consequently, no method can always choose the correct view.
We instead develop two different approaches. The first method, the maximum Sybil
policy, simply bounds the number of misclassified identities by selecting the view reporting
the most Sybils. This selected view must indict at least as many as the true view, bounding
the accepted Sybils by the number of collapsed conforming identities. Collapsing is difficult,
limiting the number of incorrect classifications.
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The second method, the view consistency policy, allows complete separation, but requires
that the following conditions be met.
• All views correctly classify some conforming identities (likely true because collapsing
identities is difficult).
• Conforming identities outnumber lying, non-Sybils (a major motivating factor for the
Sybil attack).
This approach follows from the idea that true observations are trivially self-consistent, while
lies often contradict themselves. We develop a notion of consistency that allows separation
of true and false observations.
2.4.4 Maximum Sybil Policy: Select the View Claiming the Most Sybil Identities
In this section, we prove that the maximum Sybil policy—selecting the view claiming
the most Sybil identities—produces a classification with bounded error. The number of
incorrectly-accepted Sybil identities is bounded by the number of collapsed conforming
identities.
Lemma 1. The selected view V claims at least as many Sybil identities as actually exist, i.e.,
|VS| ≥ |S |.
Proof. Since the true view V claiming |S | Sybils always exists, the selected view can claim
no fewer. 
Theorem II.1. The selected view V misclassifies no more Sybil identities than it collapses
conforming identities, i.e., |VNS ∩ S | ≤ |VS ∩ NS|.
Proof. Claiming the minimum |S | Sybil identities requires that each misclassified Sybil be
compensated for by a collapsed non-Sybil identity. Formally, combining |VS∪VNS| = |S ∪NS|
with Lemma 1 yields |(VS ∪ VNS) ∩ S | ≤ |(S ∪ NS) ∩ VS|. Removing the common VS ∩ S
from both sides gives |VNS ∩ S | ≤ |VS ∩ NS|. 
Theorem II.1 bounds the misclassifications by the attacker’s collapsing power, |VS ∩ NS|.
Although |VS ∩NS| is small (see Section 2.6), one Sybil is still accepted for each conforming
identity collapsed. The next few sections develop a second method that allows accurate
classification, but only when conforming nodes outnumber attackers.
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2.4.5 View Consistency Policy: Selecting V if LNS = ∅
Our view consistency policy stems from the intuition that lies told by those with in-
complete information often contradict each other. It is introduced here using the following
unrealistic assumption, which we remove in Section 2.4.6.
Restriction 1. All liars are Sybil, i.e., LNS = ∅, and thus all non-Sybil identities are truthful,
i.e., NS ⊆ T .
Restriction 1 endows the true view with a useful property: all receiver sets comprising
the non-Sybil identities under the true view will generate the true view. We formalize this
notion of consistency as follows.
Definition. A view is view-consistent if and only if all receiver sets comprising a subset of
the non-Sybil identities under that view generate the same view, i.e., V is view-consistent iff
∀R ∈ 2VNS : R 7→ V .
Lemma 2. Under Restriction 1, the true view is view-consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2VNS : R 7→ V.
Proof. Consider the true view V . By definition, VNS = NS . By Restriction 1, NS ⊆ T and
thus, VNS ⊆ T . ∀R ∈ 2T 7→ V , so ∀R ∈ 2VNS : R 7→ V . 
Were all false views not consistent, then consistency could be used to identify the true
view. However, a fully omniscient attacker could theoretically generate a false, consistent
view by collapsing all conforming identities. In practice, the difficulty of collapsing identities
prevents this. We formalize this attacker limitation as follows.
Condition 1. All receiver sets correctly classify at least one conforming identity, i.e.,
∀R ∈ 2I : VNS(R) ∩C , ∅.
Justification. Collapsing conforming identities requires knowing the hard-to-predict initia-
tor’s RSSI observations. Section 2.6 quantifies the probability that this condition holds.
Lemma 3. Under Condition 1, a view generated by a receiver set containing a liar is not
view-consistent, i.e., R ∩ L , ∅ implies V(R) is not view-consistent.
Proof. Consider such a receiver set R with R ∩ L , ∅. By Condition 1, r , VNS(R) ∩ C is
not empty and since r ⊆ C ⊆ T , r 7→ V . By the definition of a liar, V(R) , V and thus R is
not consistent. 
Theorem II.2. Under Restriction 1 and Condition 1 and assuming C , ∅, exactly one
consistent view is generated across all receiver sets and that view is the true view.
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Proof. By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, only the true view is consistent, so we need only show
that at least one receiver set generates the true view. C , ∅ and thus R = C 7→ V . 
This result suggests a method to identify the true view—select the only consistent view.
Restriction 1 does not hold in practice, so we develop methods to relax it.
2.4.6 Achieving Consistency by Eliminating LNS
Consider a scenario with some non-Sybil liars. The true view would be consistent were
the non-Sybil liars excluded from consideration. Similarly, a false view could be consistent
were the correctly classified conforming identities excluded. If the latter outnumber the
former, this yields a useful property: the consistent view over the largest subset of identities,
i.e., that with the fewest excluded, is the true view, as we now formalize and prove.
Condition 2. The number of conforming identities is strictly greater than the number of
non-Sybil liars, i.e., |C| > |LNS|.
Justification. This is assumed by networks whose protocols require a majority of the nodes
to conform. In others, it may hold for economic reasons—deploying as many nodes as the
conforming participants is expensive.
Condition 3. Each receiver set either correctly classifies at least |LNS| + 1 conforming
identities as non-Sybil or the resulting view, when all correctly classified conforming
identities are excluded, is not consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2I : (|VNS(R) ∩C| ≥ |LNS| + 1) ∨ (∃Q ∈
2VNS(R)\C : V(Q) , V(R)). Note that this implies Condition 2.
Justification. This is an extension of Condition 1. Section 2.6 quantifies the probability that
it holds.
Lemma 4. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest subset of I permitting a consistent
view is I \ LNS.
Proof. I \ LNS permits a consistent view, per Lemma 2. Let ER , V̂NS(R) ∩ C be the
set of correctly classified conforming nodes for a lying receiver set R, i.e., R ∩ L , ∅.
I \ ER is the largest subset possibly permitting a consistent view under R. By Condition 3,
∀R : |ER| ≥ |LNS| + 1. 
Theorem II.3. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest subset of I permitting a
consistent view permits just one consistent view, the true view.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 4 and Theorem II.2. 
In the next section, we extend the approach to handle the noise inherent to real-world
signalprints.
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2.4.7 Extending Consistency to Handle Noise
Noise prevents true signalprints from always generating the true view. Observing from
prior work that the misclassifications are bounded (e.g., more than 99% of Sybils detected
with fewer than 5% of conforming identities collapsed [1, 74]), we extend the notion of
consistency as follows.
Definition. Let γn be the maximum fraction5 of non-Sybil identities misclassified by a
size-n receiver set. Prior work suggests γ4 = 0.05 is appropriate (for |C| > 20) [1, 74].
Definition. A view is γn-consistent if and only if all size-n receiver sets that are subsets of
the non-Sybil identities under that view generate a γn-similar view. Two views V1 and V2
are γn-similar if and only if( |V1NS ∩ V2NS|
|V1NS \ V2NS|
>
1 − 2γn
γn
)∧( |V1NS ∩ V2NS|
|V2NS \ V1NS|
>
1 − 2γn
γn
)
This statement captures the intuitive notion that V1NS and V
2
NS should contain the same
identities up to differences expected under the γn bound. A view is γn-true if it is γn-similar
to the true view.
Lemma 5. Under Restriction 1, the view generated by any truthful receiver set of size n is
γn-consistent.6
Proof. Consider two views V1 and V2 generated by conforming receiver sets. Each correctly
classifies at least (1 − γn) of the non-Sybil identities, so |V1NS ∩ V2NS| ≥ (1 − 2γn)|NS|. Each
misclassifies at most γn of the non-Sybil identities, so |V1NS \ V2NS| ≤ γn|NS| and similar for
V2NS \ V1NS. The ratio of these bounds is the result. 
Substituting γ-consistency for pure consistency, Condition 3 still holds with high (albeit
different) probability, quantified in Section 2.6. An analogue of Theorem II.3 follows.
Theorem II.4. Under Condition 3, the γn-consistent view of the largest subset of I permitting
such a view is γn-true.
In Section 2.5 we describe an efficient algorithm to identify the largest subset permitting
a γ-consistent view and thus the correct (up to errors expected due to signalprint noise) Sybil
classification.
5γn is an upper bound on the total fraction misclassified, not the probability that an individual identity is
misclassified.
6This assumes that the false negative bound is negligible. If it is not, a similar notion of γ,σ-consistency,
where σ is the false negative bound, can be used. In practice σ is quite small [1, 74], so simple γn-consistency
is fine.
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Algorithm Progression
R1 7→(i1, i0)
S NS
i3
i5
i6
i2
i4
i8...
...
R|I| 7→(i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i3
i5
i2
i4
i6...
...
,
,
,V(R1)
V(R|I|) ,
...
...
7→( i5 , i1, i0)
S NS
i1
i8
i6
i3
i4
i9...
...
7→( i6 , i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i3
i5
i2
i4
i7...
...
...
7→( i3 , i5, i1, i0)
S NS
i2
i9
i6
i8
i4
i11...
...
7→( i3 , i6, i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i7
i5
i2
i4
i8...
...
...
Figure 2.5: Illustration of Algorithm 1. All |I| size-2 receiver sets are increased to size-4 by
iteratively adding a random identity from those labeled non-Sybil by the current set. With
high probability, at least one of the final sets will contain only conforming identities.
2.5 Efficient Implementation of the Selection Policies
Both the maximum Sybil and view consistency policies offer ways to select a view,
either the one claiming the most Sybils or the largest one that is γn-true, but brute-force
examination of all 2|I| receiver sets is infeasible. Instead, we describe O(|I|3) algorithms for
both policies. In summary, both start by generating O(|I|) candidate views (Algorithm 1). For
the maximum Sybil policy, the one claiming the most Sybil identities is trivially identified.
For the view consistency policy, Algorithm 2 is used to identify largest γn-consistent view.
Algorithm 1 Choose the receiver sets to consider
Require: i0 is the identity running the procedure
Require: n is the desired receiver set size
1: S ← ∅
2: for all i ∈ I do
3: R← {i0, i}
4: for cnt = 3→ n do
5: R← R ∪ {RandElement(VNS(R))}
6: end for
7: S ← S ∪ {R}
8: end for
9: return S .with high probability, S contains a truthful receiver set
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2.5.1 Candidate Receiver Set Selection
The only requirement for candidate receiver set selection is that at least one of the
candidates must be truthful. Algorithm 1 selects |I|, size-n (we suggest n = 4) receiver
sets of which at least one is truthful with high probability. As illustrated in Figure 2.5, the
algorithm starts with all |I| size-2 receiver sets (lines 2–3) and builds each up to the full
size-n by iteratively (line 4) adding a randomly selected identity from those indicated to
be conforming at the prior lower dimensionality (line 5). At least |C| of the initial size-2
receiver sets are conforming and after increasing to size-n, at least one is still conforming
with high probability:
1 −
1 − n−1∏
m=2
(1 − γm) · |C| − (m − 1)
|LNS| + (1 − γm) · |C| − (m − 1)
|C| .
Figure 2.6 shows this probability as a function of the number of conforming identities
(|C|) and the number of non-Sybil liars (|LNS|). We use size-4 signalprints (n = 4) and
γ4 = 0.05, based on previous evaluation results [1, 74]. In the shaded areas, some required
condition is not met. Recall that Algorithm 1 requires |C| > n, so that at least one size-n
receiver set composed purely of conforming nodes can be formed. The view consistency
policy requires |C| > |LNS| (Condition 2).
The signalprint threshold for this process is chosen to eliminate (nearly) all false neg-
atives, because the goal is to minimize the malicious-to-conforming ratio; false positives
are harmless during the generation of candidate views. The complexity of a straightforward
implementation is O(|I|3). Section 2.10 further discusses the runtime.
2.5.2 Finding the Largest γn-Consistent View
Given the |I| candidate receiver sets, the next task is identifying the one generating a
γn-true view, which, pursuant to Theorem II.4, is that permitting the largest subset of I to be
γn-consistent. Checking consistency by examining all 2|VNS | receiver sets is infeasible, so we
make several observations leading to the O(|I|3) Algorithm 2. For each candidate receiver set
(line 2), we determine how many identities must be excluded for the view to be γn-consistent
(lines 3–17). The view excluding the fewest is γn-true and the desired classification (line
22).
The crux of the algorithm is lines 3–17, which use the following observations to effi-
ciently determine which identities must be excluded.
7For small |C| and relatively large |LNS| the probability can be increased by building 2 · |I| or 3 · |I| or more
receiver sets instead.
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Figure 2.6: Contours of probability that at least one of the receiver sets from Algorithm 1 is
conforming.7 In the shaded areas, conditions required by either the consistency policy or by
Algorithm 1 are not met.
Algorithm 2 Find receiver set permitting the largest γn-consistent subset
Require: S is the set of receivers sets generated by Algorithm 1
Require: VNS(R) for each R ∈ {size-2 receiver sets} computed by Algorithm 1
Require: s is the initiator running the algorithm
1: (C,Rmax)← (∞, null)
2: for all R ∈ S do
3: Compute RSSI ratio for each Sybil set in VS(R)
4: c← 0
5: for all i ∈ VNS(R) do
6: e← 0
7: n← number of identities whose RSSI ratios reported by i do not match that for R
8: if |VNS(R)|+nn <
1−2γn
γn
then
9: e← 1
10: end if
11: if V(R) and V({i, s}) are not γ2-similar then
12: e← 1
13: end if
14: if e = 1 then
15: c← c + 1 . exclude i
16: end if
17: end for
18: if c < C then
19: (C,Rmax)← (c,R) . new largest γ-consistent subset found
20: end if
21: end for
22: return Rmax
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1. Adding an identity to a receiver set can change the view in one direction only—an
identity can go from Sybil to non-Sybil, but not vice versa—because uncorrelated
RSSI vectors cannot become correlated by increasing the dimension.8
2. For identities a and b, R∪ {a} 7→ V(R) and R∪ {b} 7→ V(R) implies R∪ {a, b} 7→ V(R)
because a and b must have the same RSSI ratios for the Sybils as R.
From these observations, we determine the excluded identities by computing, for each
identity in VS(R), the RSSI ratio with an arbitrary sibling (line 3) and comparing against
those reported by potential non-Sybils in VNS(R) (line 7). If the number not matching is too
large (line 8), the view is not γn-consistent and the identity is excluded (line 15). It is also
excluded if the receiver set consisting of just itself and the initiator is not γ2-similar to R
(line 11).
2.5.3 Runtime in the Absence of Liars
In a typical situation with no liars, the consistency algorithm can detect the Sybils in
O(|I|2) time. Since all identities are truthful, any chosen receiver set will be γn-consistent
with no exclusions—clearly the largest possible—and thus the other |I| − 1 also-truthful
receiver sets need not be checked. With lying attackers present, the overall runtime is O(|I|3),
as each algorithm takes O(|I|3) time.
2.6 Classification Performance Against Optimal Attackers
Both view selection policies depend directly on the unpredictability of RSSIs, because
collapsing identities requires knowing the observations of the initiator, as explained in
Section 2.4.1. An intelligent attacker can attempt educated guesses, resulting in some
successful collapses. In this section, we evaluate the two selection policies against the
optimal attackers, as defined in Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3.
2.6.1 RSSI Unpredictability
Accurately guessing RSSIs is difficult because the wireless channel varies significantly
with small displacements in location and orientation (spatial variation) and environmental
changes over time (temporal variation) [72, 81]. Pre-characterization could account for
spatial variation, but would be prohibitively expensive at the needed spatial and orientation
granularity (6 cm [82] and 3◦ for our test devices).
8This is not true for low dimension receiver sets severely affected by noise, but is for the size-(n > 4) sets
considered here.
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Figure 2.7: Distribution of RSSI variations in real-world deployment.
We empirically determined the RSSI variation for human-carried smartphones by deploy-
ing experimental phones to eleven graduate students in two adjacent offices and measuring
pairwise RSSIs for fifteen hours. The observed distribution of deviations,9 shown in Fig-
ure 2.7, is roughly normal with a standard deviation of 7.3 dBm, in line with other real-world
measurements for spatial and orientation variations (4–12 dBm and 5.3 dBm [72]). We use
this distribution to model the attacker uncertainty of RSSIs, corresponding to an attacker
who accumulates knowledge of pairwise RSSIs by observing values reported in past tests.
2.6.2 Optimal Attacker Strategy—Maximum
Sybil Policy
Theorem II.1 shows that the performance of the maximum Sybil policy is inversely
related to the number of collapsed non-Sybil identities. Therefore, the optimal attacker tries
to collapse as many as possible. We give two observations about this goal.
1. More distinct guesses increase the probability of success, so an optimal attacker
partitions its (mostly Sybil) identities, with each group making a different guess.
2. Smaller group size increases the number of groups, but decreases the probability that
the group is considered—recall that Algorithm 1 generates only |I| of the possible 2|I|
candidate receiver sets.
Consequently, there is an optimal group size that maximizes the total number of groups
(guesses) produced by Algorithm 1, which we obtained via Monte Carlo simulations. We
model the initiator’s RSSI observation as a random vector whose elements are drawn i.i.d.
from the Gaussian distribution in Figure 2.7. Given the total number of guesses, the best
9For each pair of transceivers, we subtracted the mean of all their measurements to get the deviations and
took the distribution of the pairwise deviations.
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choices are the vectors with the highest joint probabilities. The performance against this
strategy is discussed in Section 2.6.4.
2.6.3 Optimal Attacker Strategy—View Consistency Policy
The view consistency policy depends on Condition 3 holding, i.e., all consistent views
must correctly classify at least |LNS| + 1 conforming identities. In this section we quantify
the probability that it holds against an optimal attacker. To break Condition 3, an attacker
must generate a consistent view that collapses at least |C| − |LNS| conforming identities. We
give three observations about the optimal attacker strategy for this goal.
1. Collapsing |C| − |LNS| identities is easiest with larger |LNS|. Thus, the optimal attacker
uses only one physical node to claim Sybils—the others just lie.
2. For a particular false view to be consistent, all supposedly non-Sybil identities must
indict the same identities, e.g., have the same RSSI guesses for the collapsed con-
forming identities. The optimal attacker must divide its (mostly Sybil) identities into
groups, each using a different set of guesses.
3. More groups increases the probability of success, but decreases the number of Sybils
actually accepted, as each group is smaller.
We assume the optimal attacker wishes to maximize the probability of success and thus uses
minimum-sized groups (three identities, for size-4 signalprints).
For each group, the attacker must guess RSSI values for the conforming identities with
the goal of collapsing at least s , |C| − |LNS| of them. There are
(|C|
s
)
such sets, and the
optimal attacker guesses values that maximize the probability of at least one (across all
groups) being correct. The first group is easy; the |C| guesses are simply the most likely
values, i.e., the expected values for the conforming identities’ RSSIs, under the uncertainty
distribution.
For the next (and subsequent) groups, the optimal attacker should pick the next most
likely RSSI values for each of the
(|C|
s
)
sets. However, the sets share elements (only |C|
RSSIs are actually guessed), so the attacker must determine the most probable values of
the sets that are compatible. For example, the second most likely values for the set (a, b)
are (−78 dBm, −49 dBm), and the second most likely values for the set (a, c) are (−82 dBm,
−54 dBm). These two sets of values are incompatible, as one cannot simultaneously guess
both −78 dBm and −82 dBm for node a.
The above problem is non-trivial, but an attacker could conceivably solve it. In order
to model the strongest possible attack, we assume that all sets of values are compatible.
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Figure 2.8: Contours of a lower bound on the probability that Condition 3 holds under
an optimal attacker strategy with the attacker’s knowledge of RSSIs modeled as a normal
distribution with standard deviation 7.3 dBm.
For example, we assume one group can simultaneously guess (−78 dBm, −49 dBm) for the
set (a, b), and (−82 dBm, −54 dBm) for the set (a, c). Any realizable attack would use an
additional group to try both guesses. Thus, this assumption models an attack that, with the
same set of groups, has a higher success probability than any realizable attack. This leads to
a conservative lower bound on the probability that the attacker fails—any feasible, optimal
strategy is less likely to succeed.
Figure 2.8 shows contours of this lower bound on the probability that Condition 3 holds
as a function of |C| and |LNS|, obtained via Monte Carlo simulations of the super-optimal
attacker. The initiator’s RSSI observation is modeled as a random vector, whose elements
are drawn i.i.d. from the Gaussian distribution in Figure 2.7. The |C| ≤ |LNS| region is
shaded, because the view consistency policy fails there (recall Condition 2). When the
conforming nodes outnumber the attacker nodes by at least 1.5×—the expected case in real
networks—the condition holds with very high probability. In practice, it will hold with even
higher probability, as this is a lower bound.
2.6.4 Performance Comparison of Both Policies
We use Monte Carlo simulations to compare the performance of the two policies against
the optimal attackers, quantified as the final Sybil ratio, the fraction of accepted identities
that are Sybil. We model the attacker’s knowledge of the initiator’s RSSIs as a random
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Figure 2.9: The final Sybil ratio, i.e., fraction of accepted identities that are Sybil, produced
by the maximum Sybil policy against an optimal attacker strategy.
vector whose elements are drawn i.i.d. from the Gaussian distribution in Figure 2.7, which
conservatively assumes fine-grained temporal and spatial characterization (see Section 2.6.1).
We expect real-world attackers to have less knowledge, leading to even better classification
performance.
Our procedure for generating candidate receiver sets (Algorithm 1) works best when
conforming nodes outnumber physical attackers. This condition should normally hold in
real-world networks (it is the major motivation for a Sybil attack), so for both policies, we
report results assuming that it does.
Figure 2.9 graphs the final Sybil ratio of the maximum Sybil policy, which roughly
corresponds to the ratio of collapsed conforming nodes ( |VS∩NS||C| ). The performance does not
depend on the number of physical attackers. The Sybil ratio decreases to 0.05-0.2 when
|C| > 10. When |C| < 10, the Sybil ratio is high (0.2–0.5), despite elimination of most Sybil
identities (92%–99%). This behavior is due to the ease of guessing low-dimension random
vectors.
Figure 2.10 shows the final Sybil ratio of the consistency policy. Again, the |C| ≤ |LNS|
region is shaded as the policy simply fails in this case. Performance increases rapidly with
the ratio of conforming nodes to physical attackers—recall the attacker needs to collapse
|C| − |LNS| identities to break Condition 3. For example, the final Sybil ratio drops below
10−6 when |C||LNS|+1 ≥ 1.6. As the collapse rate is usually below 0.2 (see Figure 2.9 when
|C| > 10), we observe good performance when |C| − |LNS| ≥ 0.2|C| (below the 0.05 contour).
The dashed line (roughly |C||LNS|+1 = 1.2) indicates the situations where both policies perform
equally. Below it, the consistency policy performs better than the maximum Sybil policy
and above it does worse.
The view consistency policy is superior when conforming nodes are expected to outnum-
ber attacker nodes by at least 1.2×, the common case in urban environments. The maximum
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Figure 2.10: Contours showing the final Sybil ratio for the view consistency policy against
an optimal attacker strategy. The dashed line corresponds to situations where this policy has
the same performance as the maximum Sybil policy.
Sybil policy remains viable when the number of physical attackers is comparable to (or even
larger than) that of the conforming nodes. We suggest users of the Mason test consider their
application knowledge when choosing a policy.
2.7 Detecting Moving Attackers
A mobile attacker can defeat signalprint comparison by changing locations or orien-
tations between transmissions to associate distinct signalprints with each Sybil identity.
Instead of restricting the attack model to only stationary devices, we protect against moving
attacks by detecting moving nodes. Moving nodes are treated as non-conforming, in essence,
and will not be able to participate in network protocols until stationary enough to be tested
for Sybilness again. Fortunately, in the networks we consider, most conforming nodes
(e.g., human-carried smartphones and laptops) are stationary over most short time-spans
(1–2 min), due to human mobility habits. Thus, multiple transmissions should have the same
signalprints [1]. From this observation, we develop a protocol to detect moving attackers.
Again, the lack of trusted observations is troublesome. Instead of comparing signalprints,
we compare the initiator’s observations: all transmissions from a conforming node should
have the same RSSI. As shown in Section 2.9, this simple criterion yields acceptable
detection.
The protocol collection phase (Figure 2.2a) is extended to request multiple probe packets
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Figure 2.11: Contours showing the response time (in ms, 99th percentile) to precisely switch
between two positions required to defeat the challenge-response moving node detection
protocol.
(e.g., 14) from each identity in a pseudo-random order (see Section 2.8.1). During the
classification phase (Figure 2.2c) each participant rejects any identity with a large RSSI
variation across its transmissions (specifically, a standard deviation larger than 2.5 dBm).
In essence, an attacker is challenged to quickly and precisely switch between the multiple
positions associated with its Sybil identities (6 cm location precision according to coherence
length theory [82] and 3◦ orientation precision according to our measurements).
Figure 2.11 plots the required response time for an attacker to pass the challenge.
Random sequences of probe requests are generated via Monte Carlo simulations and the
required response time is calculated accordingly. Given human reaction times [83], reliably
mounting such an attack would require specialized hardware—precise electromechanical
control or beam steering antenna arrays—that is outside our attack model and substantially
more expensive to deploy than compromised commodity devices.
2.8 The Mason Test
This section describes the full Mason test protocol, an implementation of the concepts
introduced in the previous sections. There are four main requirements on the protocol.
1. Conforming neighbors must be able to participate. That is, selective jamming of
conforming identities must be detectable.
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2. Probe packets must be transmitted in pseudo-random order. Further, each participant
must be able to verify that no group of identities controlled the order.
3. Moving identities must be rejected. To save energy and time, conforming nodes that
are moving when the protocol begins should not participate.
4. Attackers must not know the RSSI observations of conforming identities when con-
structing lies.
We assume a known upper bound on the number of conforming neighbors, i.e., those
within the one-hop transmission range. In most applications, a bound in the hundreds (we
use 400 in our experiments) will be acceptable. If more identities attempt to participate,
the protocol aborts and no classification is made. This appears to open a denial-of-service
attack. However, we do not attempt to prevent, instead only detect, DOS attacks, because
one such attack—simply jamming the wireless channel—is unpreventable (with commodity
hardware). See Section 2.10 for more discussion.
The rest of this section describes the two components of the protocol: collection of
RSSI observations and Sybil classification. We assume one identity, the initiator, starts the
protocol and leads the collection, but all identities still individually and safely perform Sybil
classification.
2.8.1 Collection of RSSI Observations
Phase I: Identity Collection. The first phase gathers participating neighbors, ensuring
that no conforming identities are jammed by attackers. The initiator sends a REQUEST
message stating its identity, e.g., a public key. All stationary neighbors respond with
their identities via HELLO-I messages, each ACKed by the initiator. Unacknowledged
HELLO-Is are re-transmitted. The process terminates when the channel is idle—indicating
all HELLO-I’s were received and ACKed. If the channel does not go idle before a timeout
(e.g., 15 seconds), the protocol aborts because an attacker may be selectively jamming some
HELLO-Is. The protocol also aborts if too many identities join, e.g., 400.
Phase II: Randomized Broadcast Request: The second phase executes the challenge-
response protocol to collect RSSI observations for motion detection and Sybil classification.
First, each identity contributes a (difficult to predict) random value;10 all are hashed together
to produce a seed to generate the random sequence of broadcast requests issued by the initia-
tor. Specifically, it sends a TRANSMIT message to each participant in the random sequence,
10Even if attackers do not comply, conforming participants can verify that their own random submissions
resulted in a random sequence and therefore trust the test results.
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who must quickly broadcast a signed HELLO-II, e.g., within 10 ms in our implementation.11
Each participant records the RSSIs of the HELLO-II messages it hears. Some identities
will not hear each other; this is acceptable because the initiator needs observations from
only three other conforming identities. |I| × s requests are issued, where s is large enough to
ensure a short minimum duration between consecutive requests for any two pairs of nodes,
e.g., 14 in our tests. An identity that fails to respond in time might be an attacker attempting
to change physical position and is rejected.
In some applications, it might be desirable to meet the additional requirement that
attackers be unaware of their positions in the challenge-response sequence until challenged.
This could be achieved by allowing the initiator to use a self-generated random sequence
that cannot be verified by other participants. However, if this were done only the initiator
would be able to safely use the test results.
Phase III: RSSI Observations Report. In the third phase, the RSSI observations are
shared. First, each identity broadcasts a hash of its observations. Then the actual values are
shared. Those not matching the respective hash are rejected, preventing attackers from using
the reported values to fabricate plausible observations. The same mechanism from Phase 1
is used to detect selective jamming.
2.8.2 Sybil Classification
Each participant performs Sybil classification individually. First, the identity verifies
that its observations were not potentially predictable from those reported in prior rounds,
possibly violating Condition 3. Correlation in RSSI values between observations decreases
with motion between observations, as shown by our experiments (Figure 2.12). Thus, a node
only performs Sybil classification if it has strong evidence that the current observations are
uncorrelated with prior ones,12 i.e., it has observed an acceleration of at least 2 m/s2.
Classification is a simple application of the methods of Section 2.7 and Section 2.5.
Each identity with an RSSI variance across its multiple broadcasts higher than a threshold is
rejected. Then, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are used to identify a γ-true Sybil classification
over the remaining, stationary identities.
1110 ms is larger than the typical roundtrip time for 802.11b with packets handled in interrupt context for
low-latency responses. These packets can be signed ahead of time and cached—signatures do not need to be
computed in the 10 ms interval.
12Note that although we did not encounter this case in our experiments, it is conceivable that some devices
will return to the same location and orientation after motion.
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Figure 2.12: RSSI correlation as a function of the maximum device acceleration between
observations.
2.9 Prototype and Evaluation
We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module and tested its performance on
HTC Magic Android smartphones in various operating environments. It sits directly above
the 802.11 link layer, responding to requests in interrupt context, to minimize response
latency for the REQUEST–HELLO-II sequence (12 ms roundtrip time on our hardware).
The classification algorithms are implemented in Python. Unlike the described protocol,
mobile conforming nodes participated in all tests (i.e., nodes did not monitor their own
motion and decline to participate when moving), giving us data to tune the motion filter and
characterize the impact of node motion on the classifier performance.
The goal of this section is to evaluate the overall performance of our system in normal
settings, which is mainly dependent on the wireless environment. We therefore evaluated
the Mason test in four different environments.
Office I Eleven participants in two adjacent offices for fifteen hours.
Office II Eleven participants in two adjacent offices in a different building for one hour, to
determine whether performance varies across similar, but non-identical environments.
Cafeteria Eleven participants in a crowded cafeteria during lunch. This was a rapidly-
changing wireless environment due to frequent motion of the cafeteria patrons.
Outdoor Eleven participants meeting in a cold, open, grassy courtyard for one hour, cap-
turing the outdoor environment. Participants moved frequently to stay warm.
In each environment, we conducted multiple trials with one Sybil attacker13 generating 4, 20,
40, and 160 Sybil identities. The ratio of conforming to attacking nodes is held constant, as
13As discussed in Section 2.4 and Section 2.6, additional physical nodes are best used as lying, non-Sybils.
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Table 2.2: Thresholds for Signalprint Comparison and Motion Filtering
Name Threshold (dBm)
Signalprint Distance dimension-2 0.85
dimension-3 3.6
dimension-4 1.2
RSSI Standard Deviation 2.5
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Figure 2.13: ROC curve showing the classification performance of signalprint comparison
in different environments for varying distance thresholds. Only identities that passed the
motion filter are considered. The knees of the curves all correspond to the same thresholds,
suggesting that the same value can be used in all locations.
it does not affect performance (assuming at least one true view is generated by Algorithm 1).
The gathered traces were split into testing and training sets.
We do not study the system performance under collapsing attacks here, as it also depends
on the number of conforming and attacking nodes, and we have too few experimental
devices to meaningfully vary those counts. In Section 2.6 we independently evaluate the
performance against such attacks, using Monte Carlo simulations to vary both numbers from
5 to 200.
2.9.1 Selection and Robustness of Thresholds
The training data were used to determine good motion filter and signalprint distance
thresholds, shown in Table 2.2.
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The motion filter threshold was chosen such that at least 95% of the conforming partic-
ipants (averaged over all training rounds) in the low-motion Office I environment would
pass. This policy ensures that conforming smartphones, which are usually left mostly
stationary, e.g., on desks, in purses, or in the pockets of seated people, will usually pass
the test. Devices exhibiting more motion (i.e., a standard deviation of RSSIs at the initiator
larger than 2.5 dBm)—as would be expected from an attacker trying to defeat signalprint
detection—will be rejected.
The signalprint distance thresholds were chosen by evaluating the signalprint classifica-
tion performance at various possible values. Figure 2.13 shows the ROC curves for size-4
receiver sets (a “positive” is an identity classified as Sybil). Note that the true positive and
false positive rates consider only identities that passed the motion filter, in order to isolate
the effects of the signalprint distance threshold. The curves show that a good threshold has
performance in line with prior work [1, 74], as expected.
In all environments, the knees of the curves correspond to the same thresholds, suggesting
that these values can be used in general, across environments. A possible explanation is that
despite environment differences, the signalprint distance distributions for stationary Sybil
siblings are identical. All results in this work use these same thresholds, shown in Table 2.2.
2.9.2 Classification Performance
The performance of the full Mason test, including motion filtering and signalprint
comparison, is detailed by the confusion matrices in Figure 2.14. Note that we count all
rejected identities, including both Sybil and moving identities, as Sybil. Many tests were
conducted in each environment, so average percentages are shown instead of absolute counts.
To evaluate the performance, we consider two standard classification metrics derived from
these matrices, sensitivity (percentage of Sybil identities correctly identified) and specificity
(percentage of conforming identities correctly identified).
Note that 100% sensitivity is not necessary. Most protocols that would use Mason
require a majority of the participants to be conforming. The total number of identities is
limited (e.g., to 400), so rejecting most of the Sybils and accepting most of the conforming
identities is sufficient to meet this requirement.
Table 2.3 shows the performance for all four environments. The Mason test performs
best in the low-motion indoor environments, with over 99.5% sensitivity and over 85%
specificity. The sensitivity in the cafeteria environment is just 91.4%, likely due to the rapid
and frequent changes in the wireless environment resulting from the motion of cafeteria
patrons. In the outdoor environment, with all participants (including attackers) moving,
the sensitivity is 95.9%, and the specificity is 61.1% with all the false rejections caused by
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Figure 2.14: Confusion matrices detailing the classifier performance in the four environ-
ments. S is Sybil and C is conforming. Multiple tests were run in each environment, so
mean percentages are shown instead of absolute counts.
Table 2.3: Classification Performance
Environment Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%)
Office I 99.6 96.5
Office II 100.0 87.7
Cafeteria 91.4 86.6
Outdoor 95.9 61.1
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Figure 2.15: Relative frequencies of the three causes of false positives.
motion.
The outdoor experiment is an extreme case where we pay the cost of rejecting moving
conforming nodes to defeat motion attacks. The result is acceptable because our goal is to
produce a set of non-Sybil identities to be used safely by other protocols: accepting a swarm
of moving Sybil identities is much worse than temporarily rejecting some conforming nodes
that are currently moving.
An identity is classified as Sybil for three reasons: it has similar signalprints to another,
the initiator has too few RSSI reports to form a signalprint, or it is in motion. Figure 2.15
shows the relative prevalence of these three causes for falsely rejecting conforming nodes.
Not surprisingly, the first cause—collapsing—is rare, occurring only in the first office
environment. Missing RSSI reports is an issue only in the environments with significant
obstructions (the indoor offices) and accounts for about half of these false rejections. In the
open cafeteria and outdoor environments, all false rejections are due to participant motion.
2.9.3 Overhead Evaluation
Figures 2.16a and 2.16b show the runtime and energy overhead for the Mason test
collection phase, with the stacked bars separating the costs by sub-phase. The protocol
runs infrequently (once every hour is often sufficient), so runtimes of 10–90 seconds are
acceptable. Likewise, smartphone energy consumption is acceptable, with the extreme 18 J
consumption for 400 identities representing 0.01% of the 17.500 J capacity of a typical
smartphone battery.
Figure 2.17 show the classification phase overheads for 2–100 identities. Classification
consumes much less energy than collection, so its overhead is also acceptable. For more
than 100 participants, costs become excessive due to the O(n3) scaling behavior.14 Limiting
participation to 100 identities may be necessary for energy-constrained devices, but will
14A native C implementation might scale to 300–400 identities.
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Figure 2.17: Overhead of the classification phases.
generally not reduce performance because having 100 non-Sybil, one-hop neighbors is rare.
The periodic accelerometer sampling used to measure motion between Mason test rounds
consumes 5.2% of battery capacity in an 18 h period of use before recharging.
2.10 Discussion
Sybil classification from untrusted observations is difficult and the Mason test is not a
silver bullet. Not requiring trusted observations is a significant improvement, but the test’s
limitations must be carefully considered before deployment. As with any system intended
for real-world use, some decisions try to balance system complexity and potential security
weaknesses. In this section, we discuss these trade-offs, limitations, and related concerns.
High Computation Time: The collection phase time is governed by the 802.11b-induced
12 ms per packet latency, and the classification runtime grows quickly with the number of
identities, O(|I|3). Although typically fast (e.g., <5 s for 5–10 nodes), the Mason test is slower
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in high density areas (e.g., 40 s for 100 nodes). However, it should be run infrequently,
e.g., once or twice per hour. Topologies change slowly (most people change locations
infrequently), and many protocols requiring Sybil resistance can handle the lag—they need
only know a subset of the current non-Sybil neighbors.
Easy Denial-of-Service Attack: An attacker can force the protocol to abort by creating
many identities or jamming transmissions from the conforming identities. We cannot on
commodity 802.11 devices solve another denial-of-service attack—simply jamming the
channel—so defending against these more-complicated variants is ultimately useless. Most
locations will at most times be free of such attackers—the Mason test provides a way to
verify this condition, reject any Sybils, and let other protocols operate knowing they are
Sybil-free.
Requires Several Conforming Neighbors: The Mason test requires true RSSI observations
from some neighbors (i.e., 3) and is easily defeated otherwise. Although a detailed treatment
is beyond the scope of this work, we do note that protocols incorporating the Mason test can
mitigate this risk by (a) a priori estimation of the distribution of the number of conforming
neighbors and (b) careful composition of results from multiple rounds to bound the failure
probability.
Limit On Total Identities: This limit (e.g., 400) is unfortunately necessary to detect when
conforming nodes are being selectively jammed, while still keeping the test duration short
enough that most conforming nodes remain stationary. We believe that most wireless
networks have typical node degrees well below 400.
Messages Must Be Signed: Packets sent during the collection phase are signed, which
can be very slow with public key schemes. However, this is easily mitigated by (a) pre-
signing the packets to keep the delay off the critical path or (b) using faster secret-key-based
schemes.
Pre-Characterization Reveals RSSIs: An attacker could theoretically improve its collaps-
ing probability by pre-characterizing the wireless environment. We believe such attacks are
impractical because the required spatial granularity is about 6 cm, the device orientation is
still unknown, and environmental changes (e.g., people moving) reduces the usefulness of
prior characterization.
Prior Rounds Reveal RSSI Information: The protocol defends against this. Conforming
nodes do not perform classification if their RSSI observations are correlated with the prior
rounds (see Section 2.8.2).
High False Positive Rates: With the motion filter, the false positive rate can be high, e.g.,
20% of conforming identities rejected in some environments. We believe this is acceptable
because most protocols requiring Sybil resistance need only a subset of honest identities.
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For example, if for reliability some data is to be spread among multiple neighbors, it is
acceptable to spread it among a subset chosen from 80%, rather than all, of the non-Sybils.
2.11 Conclusion
We have described a method to use signalprints to detect Sybil attacks in open ad hoc
and delay-tolerant networks without requiring trust in any other node or authority. We use
the inherent difficulty of predicting RSSIs to separate true and false RSSI observations
reported by one-hop neighbors. Attackers using motion to defeat the signalprint technique
are detected by requiring low-latency retransmissions from the same position.
The Mason test was implemented on HTC Magic smartphones and tested with human
participants in three environments. It eliminates 99.6%–100% of Sybil identities in office
environments, 91% in a crowded high-motion cafeteria, and 96% in a high-motion open out-
door environment. It accepts 88%–97% of conforming identities in the office environments,
87% in the cafeteria, and 61% in the outdoor environment. The vast majority of rejected
conforming identities were eliminated due to motion.
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CHAPTER III
MANES: A Mobile Ad Hoc Network Emulation System
3.1 Introduction
Mobile ad hoc and delay tolerant networks (MANETs and DTNs) have a number
of advantages over infrastructure-based networks, including rapid low-cost deployment,
continued operating in the face of natural events that would disable infrastructure, lack
of susceptibility to attacks that rely on the hierarchical nature of real-world infrastructure
networks, and resistance to censorship.
We argue that experimental deployments generally yield more accurate evaluation results
for MANET and DTN protocols and applications than simulation. Such experiments allow
evaluation under real conditions that cannot practically be recreated via simulation. Although
sufficient in capturing first-order dynamics, simulation models may miss important aspects
of reality, such as the effects of real-world wireless communication environments and the
real-time interplay between application user behavior and network behavior. Trace-driven
simulations can be used to take into account additional factors such as human motion
patterns and network environments, but they also neglect the bidirectional influence between
the users and the network.
Despite of its importance, MANET and DTN experimental deployment remain rare
because it is laborious and expensive. A standard deployment usually involves recruiting
human participants, equipping them with special-purpose devices with customized hardware
and/or software, and setting up a mechanism for data collection and analysis. These tasks
are often intractable for large deployments.
We argue that the quality of MANET and DTN research and evaluation results could
be substantially improved if researchers had access to a low-cost method of deploying and
evaluating their communication protocols applications on commodity mobile devices such
as smartphones. Specifically, we propose supporting the implementation of these protocols
and applications as commodity mobile applications that run on the personally owned mobile
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devices of study participants. This approach not only eliminates the cost of changing system
software or distributing dedicated experimental hardware, but also reduces the operating
cost because existing cloud infrastructure, e.g., Google Play, becomes available for protocol
installation and update. Another advantage of using the participants’ own devices is the
execution environment faithfully reflects the mobility and usage patterns of the users.
To facilitate this crowdsourcing approach to MANET and DTN experimentation, we
aim to provide an integrated solution that guides researchers through the entire experimental
deployment lifecycle. Specifically, this solution should satisfy the following requirements.
• It is an easily installed, low-overhead software-based solution capable of running on
commodity mobile devices.
• It provides a general and convenient programming interface for wireless device-to-
device communications, supporting 802.11 device-to-device connections, which have
the best communication range and bandwidth among commodity mobile device ad
hoc communication technologies.
• It supports real-time data collection and analysis during deployments.
• Its implementation is modular and easy to extend.
Our implementation is called MANES. MANES is an Android-based cloud solution. The
client-side software provides convenient communication interfaces to the test protocols.
It also constantly updates user data, e.g., location, connectivity, and packet transmission
traces to the server. The server aggregates the data and provides the interface for real-time,
network-wide event monitoring and logging. We take advantage of Android’s existing
infrastructure, i.e., Google Play, for protocol installation and update. MANES is provided
as an open source software and users need to set up their own hosting servers for the
deployment.
The main technical challenge in developing MANES was to provide a general and con-
venient programming interface for 802.11 device-to-device communications on commodity
devices. Although 802.11 ad hoc mode is widely available on commodity wireless chips,
Android does not expose the programming interface to application developers on un-rooted
devices. Wi-Fi Direct provides device to device 802.11 connections, but current implemen-
tations are inappropriate for general use in MANETs and DTNs; for example, users must
manually confirm first-time devices connections, making routing messages through third
parties annoying to users [84].
In order to work around lack of general 802.11 device-to-device communication capabil-
ities on commodity Android devices, MANES emulates them with the help of infrastructure
46
networks. Each transmitted packet is sent to a central server, which then replays the packet to
the transmitter’s one-hop 802.11 neighbors using a novel connectivity estimation algorithm
integrated within MANES.
We observe that environmental information, e.g., Wi-Fi scan results and GPS readings,
can be used to predict the direct connectivities between devices. Our prediction technique
is based on a widely used heuristic in DTN communities which assumes that two devices
are within Wi-Fi communication range if their scan results share common Wi-Fi Access
Points [45, 46, 41, 52, 51, 48, 49]. We will refer to this technique as the “shared access point
(SAP) heuristic” in the rest of the chapter. This technique tends to be overly optimistic: it is
common for two devices scanning common APs to out of communication range with each
other. We have developed a connectivity estimation technique based on geometric principles
that is significantly more accurate.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions.
• It describes the design and implementation of MANES, a low-overhead, software
based solution that facilitates experimental deployment to evaluate MANET and DTN
protocols and applications using commodity mobile devices.
• It presents a new technique to predict pairwise 802.11 connectivities using environ-
mental Wi-Fi scan results. We show that this prediction technique yields significantly
more accurate results than widely used shared access point heuristic, according to an
experimental evaluation with 17 users for more than 2,000 hours.
• This work is also the first we are aware of to experimentally evaluate the widely used
shared access point connectivity estimation heuristic.
3.2 MANES Overview
In this section we first describe how to use MANES to help conducting a deployment. We
then explain how MANES emulates 802.11 links and its limitations. Finally, the architecture
and implementation details of MANES are described.
3.2.1 MANES Assisted Deployment
The deployment process with MANES is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The first step is to set
up MANES servers and configure the MANES client to use them, so that user traces are
transmitted to the correct backend server. The second step is to develop the test protocol
as an Android application. To set up the development environment, the MANES client
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Figure 3.1: The deployment process with the help of MANES.
needs to be installed, which provides a library for device-to-device communication (see
Section 3.2.1.1 for details). After protocol and application implementation and test, the third
step is to publish the application to the participants. We recommend standard distribution
channels, i.e., Google Play, to ease version management. Finally, during protocol execution,
one may monitor performance by analyzing the frequently updated traces on the servers (see
Section 3.2.1.1 for details). These traces are also permanently stored for offline analysis. In
cases of bug patches or protocol updates, repeat steps 2 through 4 to install new versions of
the application.
3.2.1.1 Communication APIs
MANES communication APIs provide data link layer service to higher-level protocols.
MANES is thus mainly useful for protocol developers working at the network layer and
beyond. Unlike infrastructure-based network emulation systems, MANES do not provide
services for the network or the transport layer; protocol designs at these layers of MANETs
and DTNs are still subjects of active research—MANES has the goal of making accurate
evaluation of these designs practical.
MANES communication APIs provide a straight-forward data link service. Hosts
may transmit and receive packets to and from other hosts with direct Wi-Fi connectivities.
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We observe that because collision domains in MANETs and DTNs are usually small,
the advantages of supporting link layer unicast do not justify the additional engineering
complexity. We thus remove link level addressing mechanisms (e.g., MAC addresses) and
broadcast packets. Higher-level protocols must implement addressing logic.
MANES communication APIs serve higher-level protocol’s data in units of 802.11 MAC
Service Data Units [85]. It does not provide fragmentation/aggregation services.
To use MANES APIs each protocol/application has to register an unique protocol id
with the system, which is used to demultiplex incoming packets [86]. This design is in
compliance with mainstream Internet networking systems where layer-3 protocols register
protocol IDs with network interfaces [86].
MANES provide two methods in particular, “send” and “receive”, which are similar to
commonly understood UDP datagram socket APIs. “send” immediately delivers the packet
to the wireless card and returns. “receive” is a blocking call that returns either with incoming
packets (of the caller’s protocol ID), or after a specified timeout period. We recommend
using a dedicated working thread for receiving.
3.2.1.2 User Traces
Currently MANES gathers three traces for each client: the location trace, the topology
trace, and the packet transmission trace. As soon as they are available, new entries in
each of these are transmitted to MANES servers. The location trace contains the client’s
periodic location updates, including Wi-Fi scan results and GPS readings. The topology trace
contains the client’s neighbor list, also updated periodically. The transmission trace records
each transmission from the client, including the time, raw bytes, and the corresponding
receivers.
The traces are stored as files on the MANES servers, with a dedicated subdirectory for
each client. For example, “topology/1/” stores the current topology trace of Client #1 and
“packets/5/” stores the current transmission trace of Client #5. The traces are wrapped up and
moved to permanent storages on a daily basis, e.g., to Amazon Simple Storage Service [87].
The real-time and historical traces provide complete information of the current and past
events of the deployment.
3.2.2 802.11 Link Emulation
Emulating 802.11 links requires understanding their real-world behavior. A 802.11 link
is mainly described by two factors, the data rate and the Packet Reception Rate (PRR). 802.11
supports multiple data rates ranging from 1 Mbps in 802.11b to 6.75 Gbps in 802.11ad,
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and it relies on a complex rate selection mechanism to select the most appropriate data
rate according to the current Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), so that a nearly 100% PRR is
achieved [88]. Given a SNR value, the higher the data rate, the smaller the PRR is [88].
Recall that MANES emulates a 802.11 link using an Internet communication channel
passing through a backend server. Because the data rate of this channel 1) is under the
influence of many factors out of our control and 2) is only comparable to the low data rates
of 802.11, e.g., less than 10 Mbps [89], it is impractical to use this channel to accurately
emulate the rate selection behavior of 802.11 links.
Therefore, MANES only emulates 802.11 links operating at fixed data rates, e.g., 1 Mbps
in 802.11b and 6 Mbps in 802.11g. Specifically, MANES estimates the PRR assuming
a fixed low data rate and relays packets accordingly. This poses a problem that when
application data saturates the MANES communication channel. In this case, the actual
bandwidth does not accurately match that of the true 802.11 links. It does not affect low
bandwidth applications whose data rate is far below a few Mbps, e.g., text messaging
and news distribution. However, it negatively affects the performance of latency-sensitive
high-bandwidth applications such as online gaming, VoIP, and streaming. We note that due
to latency variability, many MANETS and DTNs are inappropriate for such applications.
Another side effect of MANES’ emulation methodology is the prolonged link delay
resulting from traversing the Internet to and from MANES servers. We analyze the impact
of this delay in Section 3.4.
3.2.3 MANES Architecture
MANES continuously updates and maintains the real-time topology of an entire MANET
or DTN and use this information to allow accurate packet delivery routes and delays.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the architecture of the MANES client-server system. On the client side,
the packet I/O maintains the actual communication channels to and from the MANES servers
and provides the illusion of device-to-device communications to higher-level protocols.
The location tracker constantly monitors and reports link quality related information, i.e.,
Wi-Fi scan results and GPS readings, to the MANES servers. On the server side, the
topology estimator reevaluate the network topology upon each location update, and refreshes
the topology database accordingly, so that the topology database always stores the latest
neighbors of each node. When a transmitted packet arrives from the clients, the packet
relayer consults the topology database and relays the packet to the sender’s neighbors. The
client information database contains registration information of each client and is used for
authentication purposes.
We now discuss a few important design details.
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Figure 3.2: MANES architecture.
3.2.3.1 Scalable Architecture
To accommodate varying deployment scales, an important design goal is to support
convenient addition and removal of server instances. We achieve this goal by storing shared
global states, i.e., the current topology of the network, in a distributed database. Since
each server instance needs only the global information to perform its logic and has no
inter-dependency or direct data exchanges between each other, scaling is accomplished by
adding or killing server instances. For this approach to work, the database must also be
scalable. MANES uses the open source Project Voldemort key-value storage system [90].
3.2.3.2 Real Time Topology Estimation
A naïve way to conduct topology estimation is to recalculate the connectivities between
the sender and all the other clients upon each location update. This O(n) algorithm does not
scale well. We reduce the complexity by only considering the sender’s potential neighbors,
i.e., the clients with common APs or within reasonable GPS distances (when available) to
the sender. Each new evaluation updates the sender’s neighbor list, as well as those of its
neighbors, so that the estimated connectivities are symmetrical. Specifically, the sender is
added to the neighbor lists of its new neighbors and removed from the neighbor lists of its
old neighbors, i.e., those that are no longer connected according to the new evaluation.
In addition to location updates, another trigger for topology reevaluation is location
expiration, i.e., a client has not updated its location for so long a time, e.g., 5 minutes, that
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we consider the client to be inactive. In this case we simply remove the client from all its
latest neighbors’ neighbor lists and clear its own neighbor list.
3.2.3.3 Link Level Delay Optimization
Emulation can increase the latency of device-to-device communication because MANES
packets actually travel through the Internet and are processed by the MANES servers. The
server code was optimized reduce this delay. In addition we use a notification mechanism
with the smallest delay, the “push” mechanism, which requires keeping the server-to-client
paths constantly open. Specifically, each client periodically probes the server, e.g., every 45
seconds, to refresh the firewalls and Network Address Translators along the path.
3.2.3.4 Security and Privacy
Security is an important concern because MANES uploads fine-grained location informa-
tion to the servers: researchers using MANES are ethically responsible for informing study
participants that they will have access to location data. There is also a risk of third-party
attackers eavesdropping on users’ locations and/or send fake location updates to manipulate
messages deliveries. Therefore, each location update is automatically encrypted and signed
by the sender, the parameters for which are negotiated during the initial user registration.
3.3 802.11 Connectivity Estimation
The main technical challenge of emulating 802.11 links is to estimate whether two
devices are connected without establishing an actual communication channel between
them. Previous research demonstrated that Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI)
values are well correlated with signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and thus a practical predictor
of connectivities [88]. Our solution focuses on utilizing this information to predict 802.11
connectivities. We assume a fixed data rate, 6 Mbps, the lowest data rate supported by
OFDM [85].
For devices supporting Wi-Fi Direct (Android 4.0 or later) we propose to directly
measure the 802.11 channels via management frames. Specifically, Wi-Fi Direct devices
operate in autonomous mode as group owners. Because group owners behave as normal
APs and periodically broadcast beacons [85], other devices, including ones without Wi-Fi
Direct, can measure these beacons through normal Wi-Fi scans. Since beacons are sent
over low data rate 802.11 channels (6 Mbps OFDM) [85], scan results are direct channel
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measurements; a scanning device is connected with a group owner if the device scans the
group owner’s network and not connected otherwise.
For devices without Wi-Fi Direct support, we observe that environmental information,
e.g., Wi-Fi scan results, can be used to estimate pairwise RSSIs and thus the direct con-
nectivities between devices. The DTN community widely uses the shared access point
heuristic (SAP), which considers two devices to be within communication range if their scan
results have share APs [45, 46]. We improve upon the SAP heuristic by using geometric
relationships to estimate pairwise RSSIs.
The rest of of this section describe the Wi-Fi scan based connectivity estimation algo-
rithm and its experimental evaluation.
3.3.1 Wi-Fi Based Connectivity Estimation
The algorithm involves two steps. First the direct RSSI between two devices is estimated
based on their RSSI measurements of nearby APs. Then the estimated RSSI is compared
to a predetermined threshold to decide whether the two devices are connected. Before
explaining RSSI estimation in detail, we first introduce the relationship between RSSI and
802.11 link connectivity.
3.3.1.1 RSSI and Connectivity
Previous research has shown, both theoretically and experimentally, that for a given
802.11 data rate, the connection probability of two devices, quantified as Packet Reception
Rate (PRR), increases with SNR. The function has a sharp transition region within a couple
dBm during which the PRR increases quickly from 0 to 1 [86]. The same phenomenon is
observed for the PRR to RSSI curve, with a wider transition region, however, as RSSIs do
not perfectly predict SNRs [91].
Our experiment conducted with commodity Android devices (HTC Passion with Broad-
com 802.11a/b/g/n wireless card BCM4329) in various locations of a campus building also
confirms the result. As shown in Figure 3.3, the curve has a short transition region from
-95 dBm to -90 dBm. Note that the variations in the [-90, -70] region are probably due to
varying noise levels that are not well captured by RSSIs.
Because 1) the transition region is very small and 2) PRRs within that region are very
sensitive to RSSI variations caused by estimation errors, we do not attempt to model this
region in MANES. Instead, we use a step function with a heuristic threshold.
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Figure 3.3: The PRR-RSSI relationship as measured by our own experiments.
(a) No underestimation. (b) Large underestimation.
Figure 3.4: Examples cases of comparative locations between APs and the device-to-device
path.
3.3.1.2 RSSI Estimation
The RSSI estimation problem is closely related to the intensively researched Wi-Fi
localization problem. RSSI can be estimated with some accuracy once device locations
are known. Solutions to the Wi-Fi localization problem can be divided into two classes.
The model-based solution relies on Wi-Fi propagation models to triangulate device loca-
tions. Its accuracy is often compromised by random wireless channel variations [92]. The
measurement-based solution characterizes wireless channels more accurately, but requires
labor-intensive site surveys [73]. Recently proposed methods use additional sensors, e.g.,
accelerometers and GPS, to increase accuracy and reduce pre-characterization efforts [93].
To simplify deployment for researchers using MANES, we developed a model-based
method that does not require pre-characterization or additional sensors. As shown in
Figure 3.4a, two devices measure RSSIs of multiple common APs. Assuming a sufficient
spatial density of APs, some of them will be located close to the device-to-device path, e.g.,
the AP labeled B in Figure 3.4a. In this case, the device-to-device distance is the sum of
54
device-to-AP distances, which makes it easy to calculate the device-to-device RSSI from
the device-to-AP RSSIs. That said, since multiple common APs are measured, we still need
to determine which ones sit on the direct path. As shown in Figure 3.4a, Euclidian geometry
implies that the APs closes to the direct path have the shortest sum of device-to-AP distances,
which can be inferred from device-to-AP RSSIs. Although inferring distance from RSSI
introduces error, we will later demonstrate that the proposed approach significantly improves
estimation accuracy compared with the current state of the art.
We now derive the mathematical expression of this method (which we refer to as the
MANES method in the rest of the chapter). Recall that the path-loss model describes the
signal strength P between two devices as
P = P0 − 10r · log(d), (3.1)
where d denotes distance, P0 denotes transmitter power, and r is the path-loss exponent [94].
Assuming the i-th AP sits on the direct device-to-device path, we can express the device-
to-device signal strength as a function of the two device-to-AP signal strengths Pi1 and
Pi2,
Pi = −10r · log(10
Pi1
10r + 10
Pi2
10r ). (3.2)
Considering all the N common APs, the estimated signal strength P˜ is
P˜ = max(P1, P2, · · · , PN). (3.3)
Note that this method tends to underestimate, because the sum of device-to-AP distances
is always larger that the actual device-to-device distance, as APs are always a non-negative
distance away from the direct path. For example. the signal strength in Figure 3.4b is
largely underestimated because all the APs are far away for the direct path. Interestingly,
this inherent error varies with device-to-device distances; for a given AP density, the larger
the device-to-device distance, the smaller the estimation error, because it is more likely
for a long path to have a nearby AP. We observe that this property well serves our specific
problem. As shown in Figure 3.3, the critical RSSI region for connectivity estimation is
below -90 dBm, which corresponds to large device-to-device distances.
3.3.2 Experimental Evaluation
We evaluated the connectivity estimation algorithm using connectivity traces from
17 participants with a total duration of more than 2,000 hours. These participants carries
smartphones running custom system software allowing us to gather ground truth connectivity
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Figure 3.5: RSSI estimation performance of MANES’ method.
data. We also evaluated the widely used SAP heuristic, i.e., two devices are in connection
as long as they scan common APs, as a reference point. We report False Positive Rate
(FPR) and True Positive Rate (TPR) numbers. Since the eventual use of these connectivity
estimation algorithms is to produce MANET and DTN instances for protocol evaluations, we
also study the resulting network traces. Specifically, we produced DTN contact traces from
pairwise connectivity estimations and compare their statistics with ground truth statistics..
Finally, to have a direct understanding of how these traces influence protocol evaluations,
we use them to drive simulations of a simple flooding protocol and compare its performance
using different traces.
3.3.2.1 Trace Collection
We gathered connectivity traces from 17 participants for more than 2,000 hours. The
experimental platform is a Galaxy Nexus with Broadcom 802.11a/b/g/n wireless card
BCM4330, running a background service that periodically scans Wi-Fi networks every 20
seconds. The device also has a cell phone plan (T-Mobile) mainly for time synchronization.
Ground truth connectivities were gathered in the following way. Each device operates as
an autonomous Wi-Fi Direct group owner, constantly broadcasting SSIDs. If one device
scans another device’s network the two are connected and otherwise disconnected.
To gather connectivity data, we chose participants in groups that have co-location
opportunities. There are 4 groups in total, a 3-person group that go to a two day hiking trip
together, a 5-person group that work in two adjacent offices, a 4-person group that reside
in the same house, and a 4-person group that attend a same graduate school class. The
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Figure 3.6: Distributions of estimated RSSIs for the connected and disconnected device
pairs.
participants were asked to carry the experiment devices as their primary smartphones for a
week.
3.3.2.2 RSSI and Connectivity Estimation
Figure 3.5 shows the performance of MANES’ RSSI estimation algorithm. There is a
clear correlation between the true and estimated values. However, our algorithm tends to
underestimate when the true RSSIs are large and overestimate when they are small. The
first case is expected as the algorithm has an inherent tendency to underestimate. For the
second case, a closer look into these data samples suggests a possible explanation; some
APs have significantly larger transmit power than others and estimations based on their
measurements are also larger. We are in the process of developing an AP calibration method
to solve this problem. Despite these two sources of inaccuracy, MANES still produces
results significantly more accurate results that other state-of-the art connectivity estimation
techniques.
We ultimately care about the separation power of the estimated RSSIs between the
connected and disconnected cases. Figure 3.6 shows that the distributions of estimated
RSSIs for the two cases are well separated. We use a heuristic RSSI threshold of -85 dBm
for classification. Table 3.1 shows the resulting False Positive and True Positive Rates for
the MANES and the SAP method. As expected, SAP has a high FPR because two devices
scanning common APs are not necessarily connected. The MANES method reduces the
FPR by distinguishing disconnected cases using RSSI estimations.
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Table 3.1: Classification Performance of Pairwise Connectivities
FPR TPR
SAP 0.054 0.998
MANES 0.023 0.995
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Figure 3.7: CCDF of inter-contact times of the real, MANES produced, and SAP produced
contact traces.
3.3.2.3 DTN Statistics
To understand how pairwise connectivities influence the resulting network instances we
extract contact traces from connectivity estimations. Contact traces are used to drive DTN
protocol simulations and are thus critical to their evaluation. As a matter of fact, a large
body of DTN protocols are evaluated using estimated contact traces generated from Wi-Fi
scan traces by the SAP heuristic. The Dartmouth [45] and UCSD traces [46] are commonly
used in this way.
We show two metrics of the contact traces that are considered critical to the performance
of DTN protocols: the inter-contact time distribution and contact-duration distribution [41].
Inter-contact time is the time separation between two consecutive contacts of a pair of
devices. It represents how frequently a device meets other devices. As shown in Figure 3.7,
the distribution produced by the MANES method is closer to reality, while both methods
are more likely to have long inter-contact time than the reality. A likely explanation is false
positive connectivities fill in the small disconnected “gap”s between contacts and in effect
remove these short inter-contacts. MANES performs better because it is less likely to have
false positives.
As shown in Figure 3.8, the same phenomenon is observed for the contact duration
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Figure 3.8: CCDF of contact durations of the real, MANES produced, and SAP produced
contact traces.
distributions; both methods are more likely to have long contact durations than the reality,
while the problem is less severe for MANES. A likely explanation is false positive connec-
tivities extend the duration of each contact. Also, two short contacts separated by a small
disconnection “gap” may be merged into one long contact by false positive connectivities.
3.3.2.4 DTN Protocol Simulation
Finally, we conduct simulations of a simple flooding protocol using the real, MANES
produced and SAP produced contact traces, and compare the resulting protocol performance.
During the simulation every node initiates the flooding process every three hours. For each
flooding process we record the percentage of the network reached each hour.
Figure 3.9 shows the medium flooding process for all three traces. Both traces propagate
messages faster than reality, while the MANES traces are much more closer to reality. For
example, to deliver a message to the whole network, SAP is ∼24 hours (34%) faster than
the reality, while MANES is only ∼5 hours (7%) faster. Note that the network sizes of these
traces are less than 5 at any point of time, as our largest participant group is of 5 persons.
We thus expect a much larger performance mismatch for larger networks.
3.3.3 Conclusions and suggestions
The SAP method is widely used in DTN communities to produce contact traces and
drive protocol evaluations [41, 52, 51, 48, 49]. This experimental evaluation is the first
attempt, to our knowledge, to evaluate the SAP method and study its influences over protocol
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Figure 3.9: Simulation performance of a flooding protocol using the real, MANES produced,
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Figure 3.10: The effect of link delays.
evaluations. Our evaluation results show that it is promising to use environmental Wi-Fi
RSSI measurements to conduct pairwise connectivity estimations. However, we found a
significant mismatch between protocol performances estimated using the SAP connectivity
traces and the real traces, and also found that the MANES connectivity estimation method
yields results significantly closer to reality. It is our goal to raise awareness of this problem
and provide a way for researchers to significantly improve the accuracies of their evaluation
results in the future.
3.4 Emulation Overhead of Link Delays
Link delays influence protocol executions in three different ways, judged by whether the
original packet delivery path and the overall delay over that path are changed by the link
delay. Figure 3.10 illustrates these three cases with a simple example where device N1 tries
to send a packet to N3 through N2. Each row represents the states of a device over time. A
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dashed rectangle between two rows represents a period of time when the two corresponding
devices are in contact. N1 first meets N2 and delivers the packet immediately. After some
time N2 meets N3 and is kept in contact for a while. Path P0 (marked with the thickest
arrows) shows the original packet delivery path with no link delays.
The three cases follow. Link delay may have no influence on either the packet delivery
path or the overall delay, as shown by P1 with a link delay of D1. It may not influence the
packet delivery path, but prolongs the overall delay, as shown by P2 with a link delay of D2.
It may change the packet deliver path (and therefore the overall delay), as shown by P3 with
a link delay of D3.
In P1 the link delay is “buffered” by the wait time before encountering the next contact
and therefore has no influence over either the packet delivery path or the overall delay. This
happens in networks with rare encounters and disrupted paths, i.e., Delay Tolerant Networks
(DTNs).
In P2 the packet delivery path is not changed because the topology remains constant
during the delay interval (although the packet arrives at N2 at a delayed time, N2 is still able
to deliver it to N3 because they kept in contact during this time). However, the overall delay
adds up as the number of hops increases. This happens in networks with comparably stable
topologies, e.g., static networks.
In P3 N2 could not deliver the packet to N3 because it has already lost contact with
N3 when the packet arrives. This happens in networks with comparatively fast changing
topologies, e.g., vehicle ad hoc networks.
Specifically, MANES introduces less than 200 ms delay on each emulated (potentially
multi-hop) link, most of which spent traversing the Internet to and from the MANES server).
For DTNs (e.g., sparse networks with human-carried devices) this comparatively short delay
has no influences over protocol execution because it is often “buffered” and annihilated
by inter-contact gaps, which ranges from minutes to days. Therefore MANES can be
used to evaluate DTNs. MANES cannot evaluate networks that are so highly dynamic that
topology changes commonly occur every 200 ms. However, it is appropriate for less dynamic
MANETs and DTNs, e.g., most network composed of human-carried mobile devices.
3.4.1 Maximum Tolerable Link Delay
To help users decide whether MANES can be used to evaluate their target networks, we
propose the notion of maximum tolerable link delay to quantify a network’s sensitivity level
to link level delays. Networks with maximum tolerable link delays comparable to or smaller
than a few hundred milliseconds cannot be evaluated by MANES. Users can estimate this
metric for their target networks via simulations with realistic mobility models, for example.
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Algorithm 3 Calculate the maximum tolerable link delay Ttor of a path.
cnum← the total number of contacts in the path
Ttor ← ∞, i← 1
while i ≤ cnum do
Ci ← the i-th contact in the path
Ti ← the packet arrival time during Ci
j← i + 1
while j ≤ cnum do
C j ← the j-th contact in the path
T j ← the end time of C j
T ← (T j − Ti)/( j − i)
if T < Ttor then
Ttor ← T
end if
j← j + 1
end while
end while
The maximum tolerable link delay over a packet delivery path is the link delay beyond
which the packet can no longer be delivered over that path. For example, for the N1 →
N2 → N3 path in Figure 3.10, delays D1 and D2 (which produce P1 and P2 respectively) are
tolerable, as the packet can still be delivered over that path. D3 (which produces P3) is not
tolerable, as the packet can no longer reach N3 via N2. This metric is related to the time
continuity (i.e., how often the path is interrupted by waiting for the next contact) and the
stability (i.e., how long each contact lasts) of the path. The maximum tolerable link delay of
a network is an accumulated statistic for all the shortest paths in that network.
Algorithm 3 presents the procedure for calculating the maximum tolerable delay of a
given path. Note that we model a path as a sequence of contacts, and each packet delivery
happens during a contact. For example, the N1 → N2 → N3 path composes of two contacts,
N1 ↔ N2 and N2 ↔ N3.
We generated the maximum tolerable link delay distribution of a realistic DTN composed
of human carried devices. The traces are generated from the association histories of all
the Wi-Fi devices in Dartmouth College from 2003 to 2004 [45]. We believe the resulting
network is representative of DTNs with human carried devices. Figure 3.11 shows the
distribution, whose 95th percentile is 571 ms, which is far greater than the link delay
introduced by MANES. This indicates that MANES can be used to evaluate DTNs with
human-carried devices. Figure 3.12 shows that the maximum tolerable link delay decreases
with the device density of the network. Dartmouth traces (the point marked as “Dartmouth
College”) has a very high device density (more than 4,000 devices in a 0.6 km2 area),
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Figure 3.11: The maximum tolerable link delay distribution of Dartmouth traces.
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Figure 3.12: The 99th percentile of maximum tolerable link delays vs. device density.
meaning more than 70% of the student body participated in that network. We expect sparser
device densities for most MANET and DTN studies and therefore higher tolerance to link
delays, as shown by the points with smaller densities, which were generated by randomly
removing devices from Dartmouth traces.
3.5 Deployment Experiences with MANES
We used MANES to conduct a large scale deployment of a DTN application, involving
around 300 participants. The application is called 1am, a censorship-resistant news distri-
bution service built on a DTNs composed of human-carried devices. MANES allows us to
connect important information about user movement and message propagation. We will
describe in Chapter IV and Chapter V the details and discoveries of this deployment.
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3.6 Conclusion
We developed and implemented MANES, an emulation system to enable MANET
and DTN researchers to easily conduct experimental deployments of their protocols and
applications. We have demonstrated improved network topology estimation accuracy relative
to the widely used shared access point heuristic without imposing precharacterization
burdens on researchers.
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CHAPTER IV
Campus Delay Tolerant Networks With One Hundred
Thousand Participants: Trace Collection
4.1 Introduction
In recent years with the emergence and popularization of high performance, multi-
functional mobile computing devices, e.g., smartphones and laptops, infrastructureless
networks composed of these devices are attracting increasing attention from not only
researchers and developers [32, 41, 42, 33, 43], but also end users. In 2014, a local mesh
networking chat program called FireChat experienced explosive downloads from protesters
of the “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong, due to the threat of potential denial of service
attacks on the Internet-based Instagram [34].
These self-organizing, device-to-device networks are usually modeled as Delay Tolerant
Networks (DTNs). Since node-to-node communication depends on short range radio, e.g.,
802.11 or Bluetooth, end-to-end connectivity often does not exist and human movements
play a major role in ferrying information, causing comparatively long delays.
Because of their natural resistance to surveillance and censorship, DTNs have the
potential to support secure, censorship-resistant communication. It is expensive to control
these networks, as it requires controlling a large portion of the participating devices privately
owned by hundreds of thousands of people. It is even more expensive to shut them down,
as any two devices could form a network and start information exchange. Because DTNs
experience comparatively long delays, e.g., hours instead of milliseconds, we envision using
them to support local, latency insensitive information exchange, e.g., within a university or
company campus, a town, or a small city with hundreds of thousands of people.
The foremost challenge in designing practical DTN systems capable of serving a local
community is our lack of understanding of large scale DTNs, in particular their capacities in
terms of message delivery performance, robustness to node failures, and energy overhead.
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This lack of understanding is rooted in the lack of fine granularity, large scale device
connectivity (or contact) traces. It is difficult to collect large scale device contact traces,
because it requires recruiting a large number of participants. We cannot piggyback the data
collection on mobile platforms with established user groups, either, as there are no popular
platforms or applications that actively utilize wireless device-to-device communication. The
largest existing trace to our knowledge involves 22,341 students in a university campus,
and is inferred from these students’ course schedules [47]. The granularity of this trace is
likely much coarser than reality, as all devices in the same class are assumed to be able to
communicate during the entire course of the class. In addition, this trace considers only
contact opportunities resulting from sitting in same classes, overlooking a significant number
of other opportunities, e.g., residing in the same dormitory, or having lunch in the same
dining hall.
We attempted two methods to collect fine granularity, large scale mobile device connec-
tivity traces. The first method is active installation of measurement software on volunteer
users’ personally owned smartphones. We developed a prototype microblogging application
on Android, named 1am [60], and made it available to volunteers in the University of
Michigan campus. Over a period of seven months in 2013, 1am had 291 users, with 111
users during a month of high activity on which our analysis focuses. We collected fine
granularity, device-to-device wireless connectivity traces from these volunteers through
continuous and frequent connectivity sampling, on average every 115 seconds. We refer to
these traces as “the 1am dataset” in the rest of the thesis.
The second method is passive collection of WiFi association records, which was first
used by Song and Kotz to collect large-scale device contact traces at Dartmouth College [95].
They obtained WiFi association record from their campus WiFi network’s operator, and
use it to infer direct 802.11 contacts; two devices associated with the same access point
simultaneously are considered to be in contact. As campus WiFi network tends to cover
popular locations with most human activities, this method records a significant portion of
on-campus contacts. Its coverage is even better nowadays with the ever-expanding WiFi
coverage and ever-increasing adoption rate of smartphones on university campuses.
We use the same WiFi-based method to gather contact traces on the University of
Michigan campus, involving 119,055 mobile devices for a month. This number is about
twice the U-M population, indicating a high coverage ratio of the campus population. This
is also the largest scale human contact trace, to the best of our knowledge. We refer to these
traces as “the U-M dataset”.
To understand its underlying network structure, we construct a connectivity graph of
human contacts involving 119,055 mobile devices from the U-M dataset. We study basic
66
Figure 4.1: 1am architecture.
properties of this graph, reporting significantly higher node degrees (2863), shorter path
lengths (2.3), and higher cluster coefficient (0.357) than popular online social networks.
We show that its degree distribution has an exponential, instead of power-law tail. We also
report that the human contact network shows strong “assortative mixing”.
The remaining parts of this chapter focus on describing the trace collection methodology
and basic statistics of these two datasets. It gives an overview of participants’ motion and
contact patterns, and provides background for understanding the performance numbers in
Chapter V. Specifically, Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 describe the 1am dataset. Section 4.4
describes the U-M dataset. In Section 4.5 we study basic properties of the static human
contact graph constructed from the U-M dataset. The detailed analysis on message delivery
performance, robustness, and energy overhead of these DTNs is described in Chapter V.
4.2 1am: Microblogging on DTNs
We developed a prototype of 1am, an infrastructureless DTN-based microblogging
application, and provided it to volunteers in a college town with a student and faculty
population of 50,000. The application was instrumented (with knowledge of the study
participants) to gather mobility and wireless connectivity data. This section describes the
design of the 1am microblogging application, providing background and context to the
subsequent performance analysis sections in Chapter V.
4.2.1 Overview
1am is designed to functionality similar to Twitter. Posts are public text messages
containing up to 514 characters. Users can post new messages, make comments, and
retransmit (analogous to retweet) messages and comments from others. Its main user
interface (UI) displays a timeline of incoming messages.
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We now describe some of 1am’s characteristics and features.
Identity Management: 1am has no central registry that might be used to enable block-
ing, censorship, or surveillance attacks; it uses a fully distributed design. Users are uniquely
identified by self-generated public keys, created locally during application installation. In
other words, the public key is the identity, eliminating any need of certification authorities
for certifying identity-key associations. We allow 1am users to have human readable user
names, which may collide. We resolve user name collisions by comparing public keys that
are extremely unlikely to collide. The UI is designed to make the implications clear to users
when the same user name is associated with different keys.
Message Authenticity: Like all public communication systems, 1am is subject to
rumors and misinformation. Conventional solutions relying on centralized filtering or
censorship cannot be used, due to 1am’s decentralized architecture. To increase the cost of
disinformation campaigns, we protect the authenticity of 1am posts with digital signatures,
which are individually verified by each receiver. The intention is for credible 1am users to
gradually build up positive reputations. In addition, it would be possible to use distributed
spam or propaganda detection techniques [96]. There is no requirement for users to associate
their actual identities with their 1am identities.
Multimedia Support: Bandwidth is a scarce resource in device-to-device networks:
1am cannot support content of arbitrary size. Our study shows that it is feasible to support
images. However, without re-designs of the message delivery protocol or major improve-
ments on wireless transceiver energy efficiency, video sharing cannot be supported in our
system (see Section 5.5).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the architecture of 1am. From the bottom up, the first layer is
in charge of contact discovery and link establishment. It detects contact opportunities,
establishes an 802.11 ad hoc channel with discovered peers, and informs higher level
protocols. Note that this layer is not 1am-specific and should be shared by all DTN
applications. The second layer is the message delivery protocol that routes 1am messages to
intended receivers. Finally, when a 1am message arrives, the UI is informed and the message
is stored in a database for future use, e.g., re-transmission. The UI’s displays messages
according to given filtering rules, e.g., those from immediate wireless communication
neighbors or “followed” identities.
We choose 802.11 ad hoc technology over Bluetooth for device-to-device communica-
tion, because the former has longer transmission range. We avoided WiFi Direct due to the
inconvenience of its pairing process, which requires human involvement, as well as its lack
of broadcast support.
Although modern smartphone hardware and operating systems support 802.11 ad hoc
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communications, at the time of the study an API was not provided by Android. During
our 1am deployment study, to avoid requiring users to “root” their phones, we used an ad
hoc network emulation layer to identify direct wireless connectivity, deliver messages, and
gather data1 (See Section 4.3.1 for more details).
4.2.2 Message Delivery Protocol
We use a flooding protocol for message delivery for two reasons. First, flooding protocols
can be used to support arbitrary filtering rules. At this stage we are not sure which rules are
most appropriate for DTN-based microblogging services and therefore avoid any premature
optimization tying the system design to specific rules. Second, in non-congested situations,
e.g., for applications with small traffic volume, flooding protocols have the best message
delivery performance and worst energy consumption among all routing protocols. Therefore,
they serve as good reference points for understanding the limitations of the underlying
network and provide guidance for further optimization.
To avoid redundant message transmissions, we exchange Bloom filters during each
contact to learn about each node’s received and not-yet-received messages. Bloom filters
are compact data structures for storing elements and testing set membership [97]. They are
widely used in DTN routing protocols for their space- and bandwidth-efficiency. Specifically,
each node stores all its received messages in a Bloom filter that is exchanged at each contact.
The other party could then test which of its own messages have not been received by the node.
Classic Bloom filters use 14.4 bits per key for a 10−3 set membership test error rate [97].
This is much smaller than the original message it documents.
4.3 1am Dataset Description
This section describes the data collection platform of the 1am deployment, and provides
basic statistics on the gathered traces. It gives an overview of participants’ motion and
contact patterns, and provides background for understanding the performance numbers in
Chapter V.
4.3.1 Deployment Platform
Commodity Android devices do not support appropriate 802.11 ad hoc communica-
tion [98]. Enabling it would require rooting participants’ phones, which we consider an
1We subsequently developed an application-level method that supports direct device-to-device WiFi
communication on Android platforms.
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unacceptable barrier to study participation. Instead, we applied a widely used technique in
the DTN research community to estimate 802.11 contact opportunities. To simplify, two
devices with simultaneous visibility of common WiFi access points are considered to be
capable of direct communication [95, 41].
We use a data collection platform we designed for assisting DTN protocol deployments,
called MANES [99]. It gathers time-varying location and wireless environment measure-
ments. It also estimates contact opportunities based on WiFi scan results and provides
applications with an emulated 802.11 ad hoc communication interface. MANES replaces
the “contact discovery and link establishment” layer in Figure 4.1.
MANES has two components, an Android client that gathers GPS and WiFi scan
measurements, and a backend server that aggregates and stores user traces. Location data
are uploaded as soon as they become available to support up-to-date topology estimation, as
the server uses the estimated topology to relay packets between 802.11 neighbors.
To save energy for the client, automated sampling frequency adjustment is used when
taking both WiFi and GPS measurements. If there are no significant changes since the last
measurement, further WiFi scans are postponed for 120 seconds and further GPS scans are
postponed for five minutes. Otherwise, the WiFi sampling frequency is 30 seconds and the
GPS sampling frequency is one minute. Because humans are usually stationary, the average
WiFi measurement period in the collected traces is 114.5 seconds.
4.3.2 Participant Recruitment
1am traces are collected from fully informed users with their consent. We released 1am
to the university community and advertised via posters, gifts of promotional water bottle,
and word of mouth. We had 291 users, each of whom used the application at least three days
from March to October in 2013. Most were university students. The median trace duration
per user is 24 days. We use the first 31 days of traces, the month with the maximum number
of participants, for the analysis in the rest of this chapter. We refer to this period as the study
period. During the study period, we had 111 active study participants, with an average of 85
active participants each day.
4.3.3 Contact Statistics
During the study period, 98,072 inter-participant wireless communication contacts were
made, with an average of 20 contacts, six of which were unique, per user, per day. 10%
of users made no contacts. The average contact rate is 0.0329 contacts per pair per hour,
which is much higher than the rate of other WiFi-based contact traces widely used in the
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Table 4.1: Comparison of Contact Traces
U-M Dartmouth 1am UCSD
Year 2015 2003/2004 2013 2002
Device Laptop/Smartphone Laptop/PDA Smartphone PDA
Duration (days) 30 114 31 77
Granularity (seconds) NA 300 114.5 120
Devices participating 119,055 6,648 111 273
Number of contacts 523,951,695 4,058,284 98,072 195,364
# contacts/pair/hour 0.00025 0.000067 0.033 0.0028
DTN community (see the last row in Table 4.1). We suspect there have been changes
in normal smartphone users’ behaviors since those traces were gathered. In our study,
users were carrying their own modern, compact, highly functional smartphones and in the
UCSD [46] and Dartmouth traces [45], they were carrying either limited-functionality PDAs
or laptops; these devices were carried less frequently than modern smartphones, resulting in
decreased contact frequency. It is also possible that 1am users tend to recruit friends and
acquaintances with whom they have frequent contact. Previous research shows correlation
between physical proximity and social relationships [100].
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Figure 4.2: Contact duration and inter-contact time distributions, each following (truncated)
power law distributions.
Figure 4.2 shows the distributions of contact duration and inter-contact time. The contact
duration has a median of 149 seconds. The inter-contact time has a (truncated) power law
distribution in the 30 s–1 day range, with a coefficient of 0.3. This is consistent with prior
research findings [41].
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Figure 4.3: Average # of contacts by weekday, showing a strong weekday/weekend pattern.
4.3.4 Diurnal Patterns
Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 illustrate a weekly and diurnal pattern of contact numbers,
which is expected for a population that is working or studying during weekdays. Note that a
pair can meet and have contacts multiple times in a day. On an average weekday (Figure 4.4,
“Weekdays”), the contact number starts to rapidly increase at 9 a.m. and is at its highest from
1 p.m. to 3 p.m. It then gradually decreases, reaching a minimum at around 3 a.m. On an
average weekend (Figure 4.4, “Weekends”) the contact number stays almost constant at the
minimum level of the average weekday. This difference would be expected for a population
in which most contacts result from co-location during weekday work or study.
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Figure 4.4: Average # of contacts by hours, showing a strong diurnal pattern with its peak in
the early afternoon.
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Figure 4.5: Geographic distribution of the contacts, illustrating the two university campuses.
The majority of contacts occured in the Northeast Campus.
4.3.5 Geographic Patterns
To better understand the study population, we examined the geographic locations of
contacts. Not all contacts are associated with GPS readings (only 27.6% are), but all are
associated with WiFi scan results. This is expected, as humans typically spend most of
their time indoors and GPS readings are often not available indoors. We used the following
algorithm to estimate GPS locations based on WiFi scan results. We first estimate the GPS
locations of WiFi access points using location samples containing both GPS readings and
WiFi scan results; the location of one access point is the average of the GPS locations for all
measurements with WiFi scans containing that access point. We then estimate the location
of each contact event associated with only WiFi scans as the estimated location of the access
point with the highest signal strength in these scans. This algorithm allows us to estimate
the locations of 99.4% of the contact events.
To simplify explanation and analysis, we divide the entire area into 100 m×100 m discrete
locations that we associate contact events with. There are 239 discrete locations with at
least one contact, each. Contacts are distributed unevenly. If the locations are ordered by
frequency of contacts, we find that 90% of the contacts occur in the first 25% of locations.
Figure 4.5 shows the map of the first 100 locations, with the shade indicating number of
contacts. These locations are visually clustered into two components, clearly outlining the
two campuses of the university that where the study was done. The Northeast Campus,
where the study was most heavily promoted, has more contacts.
To further understand the context of the contacts on each campus, we consider their
temporal patterns. Figure 4.6 shows the average number of contacts in the two campuses by
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Figure 4.6: Total # of contacts in the two campuses in an average week. “Location1”
(the Northeast Campus) shows weekly and diurnal patterns. “Location2” (the Southwest
Campus) does not have obvious patterns.
weekday. The Northeast Campus curve (“Location1”) has clear weekly and diurnal patterns,
while the Southwest Campus curve (“Location2”) does not. This suggests that most 1am
users work in the Northeast Campus (in fact in a few very concentrated areas of that campus,
i.e., the darkest few grid elements), instead of the Southwest Campus.
4.4 U-M Dataset Description
This section describes the collection and basic statistics of the U-M dataset, the contact
traces of all WiFi-enabled devices on the University of Michigan Ann Arbor campus, who
have ever logged into the campus WiFi network during our study period.
The U-M dataset is collected through passive collection of WiFi association histories.
Nearly all buildings on this campus, including residence halls, are covered by a university
managed WiFi network. With the help of U-M Information and Technology Services, we
obtained all the association/disassociation activities on this network in the month of April
2015, which involves 6,277 WiFi access points and 119,055 client devices. The recorded
device number is nearly twice the U-M population (69,408[101, 102]), likely because each
person owns more than one devices. During this month, each device has on average 13 days
with recorded WiFi activities, and an accumulated daily association duration of 3.66 hours
on these days.
Figure 4.8 shows the number of recorded devices per hour in an average week, clearly
reflecting the diurnal and weekday/weekend patterns of campus activities. There are as
many as 35,000 devices in the busy hours of weekday early afternoons. Even in the most
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Figure 4.7: # of recorded devices per hour on the U-M WiFi network in an average week.
quiet hours of weekend nights, there are more than 5,000 devices.
The remaining part of this section describes the statistics of the U-M contact trace
dataset, laying a foundation for understanding the network behaviors in Chapter V.
4.4.1 Contact Statistics
Table 4.1 summarizes the U-M contact dataset. During the course of a month, we
recorded 524 million contacts among 119,055 devices. The average number of contacts
per pair per hour is 0.00025. We also listed the aforementioned Dartmouth contact trace in
comparison, which was collected more than a decade ago [95]. The U-M trace has around
20X increase in device numbers and 100X increase in contact numbers, resulting in 4X
increase in average contact rate. This is likely a result of increased mobile device adoption
rate and WiFi coverage in the last decade.
The forth column in Table 4.1 lists a much smaller scale dataset, the 1am dataset, that
we collected through active participant recruiting on the same location, the U-M campus.
As shown in the table, this dataset has a much higher average contact rate than the U-M one,
likely because this subgroup were sampled in a biased way—we recruited most of them
from one campus location on one workday. Interestingly, we calculated the average contact
rate between pairs with at least one contact in the U-M dataset, and the resulting contact
rate is almost the same (0.032) as that of 1am. This result indicates that instead of having a
uniform contact rate with all others, people only get in contact with a small group of people,
regardless of how large the population size is. We will frequently refer to and compare with
the 1am traces in the remaining parts of this chapter, as contrasting these two datasets helps
deepen our understanding of the properties of human contact networks.
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Figure 4.8: Inter-contact time distribution for the U-M dataset.
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Figure 4.9: Contact duration distribution for the U-M dataset.
Figure 4.8 shows the inter-contact time distribution of the U-M dataset in log-log scale.
It is a truncated power-law distribution modulated by a periodic trend. The median inter-
contact time is 8.97 minutes. The inset plot with a linear X-axis (in unit of days) illustrates
the periodicity more clearly, showing continuous peaks at 24, 48, 72 hours. . . This reflects
the well-known phenomenon that people’s movements are highly regular and they likely
return to same locations day by day [58]. There are multiple peaks, instead of only one
at exactly 24 hours, because people do not repeat their lives exactly every day. After a
contact is missed because one person did not follow his/her routine that day, the pair have
to wait for multiple days until both show up in their routine “rendezvous” again. Note that
the inter-contact time of 7 days has higher probability than that of 1 day, likely because
weekly patterns are more dominant in campus activities, e.g., going to a class once a week.
Figure 4.9 shows the contact duration distribution. It is also a power-law distribution with a
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Table 4.2: Comparison of Network Graphs
U-M network Facebook [103] Twitter [104] Internet [105]
Year 2015 2011 2007 1999
Nodes 119,055 721,000,000 87,897 6,374
Links 168,000,000 68,700,000,000 829,247 NA
Scale-free? No No Yes Yes
Avg. degree 2,863 190 18.9 3.82
Avg. path length 2.3 4.7 4.12 2 3.72
Assortativity coeff. 0.357 0.226 0.58 -0.189 3
WCC size 98.64% 99.91% 93.03% NA
Cluster coeff. 0.473 [0.11,0.32] 4 0.106 0.24
steeper slope. The median contact duration is 76 seconds.
4.5 Static Human Contact Graph Analysis
Graph analysis is a powerful tool to study complex networks. To gain insights on the
structure of human contact networks, we construct a static graph out of the U-M contact
traces and examine its basic properties. The contact graph is constructed in the following
way. A vertex represents a mobile device. An edge is drawn between a pair of vertices
as long as there is at least one contact between the two devices during the one month
study period. The resulting graph includes 119,055 vertices and around 168 million edges.
Table 4.2 summarizes the basic properties of the U-M human contact graph. We also listed a
few well-known networks for comparison: the friendship graph of Facebook users [103], the
following relationship graph of Twitter users [104], and the connectivity graph of Internet
autonomous systems [105].
Similar to the two social networks, the human contact network has positive assortativity
coefficient and a giant connected component containing the majority of the vertices. On the
other hand, three properties of the human contact network are noticeably different. First, the
average node degree is much larger. An average device encounters nearly 3,000 others on
campus, while an average Facebook or Twitter user has less than 200 friends; we encounter
far more people than we keep friendship with. Second, the average path length is shorter.
An average path length of 2.3 means that it only takes 1.3 people to connect any two people,
suggesting that the campus community is a tightly connected “small world”. Third, the
cluster coefficient is much higher, even higher than that of the Facebook friendship graph.
2Not reported in [104]. Extracted from another Twitter dataset [106].
3Not reported in [105]. Extracted from another Internet AS graph dataset[107].
4Not directly reported in [103]. We calculated this range according to Figure 1(b) and Figure 4(a) [103].
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Figure 4.10: The degrees distribution.
This is likely because all people in one location are probably in contact with each other
simultaneously.
These basic properties outline a densely connected, locally clustered, small-world
network. We now take a more closer look at its structure, in particular the degree distribution
and assortativity.
4.5.1 Degree Distribution
Figure 4.10 shows both the probability density function (PDF) and the complementary
cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of degrees in a log-log plot. The distribution is
skewed to the right; the median degree is 1120 and the average is 2863. We make two
observations regarding the shape of the distribution. First, the distribution has a power-law
shape in the left end (below the degree of 1,000), as both the PDF and CCDF are linear in
this region. Second, the distribution has an exponential tail in the right end (beyond the
degree of around 17,000), as the log-linear inset plot shows a clearly linear curve in that
region. It is not clear how to characterize the region between 1,000 and 17,000. Nevertheless,
it is safe to conclude that the degree distribution of our human contact network does not
follow power-laws, whose CCDFs should be straight lines on a log-log plot. This sets apart
the human contact network from most social networks and the Internet, since they are shown
to have power-law degree distributions [104, 105, 108]. On the other hand, due to the trend
on the lower end the degree distribution cannot be classified as exponential, either, which
sets apart the human contact network with random networks that have uniform mixing
patterns [109].
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Figure 4.11: The scatter plot of average neighbor degrees (<knn>) versus node degrees.
4.5.2 Assortativity
We also examine the mixing patterns of the human contact network. Figure 4.11
illustrates the scatter plot of the average degree of a node’s neighbors (<knn>) versus the
degree of the node itself (k), showing a clearly positive correlation. The assortativity
coefficient is 0.357. To show the trend more clearly, we plot the sliding window average in
the dotted line. As illustrated, <knn> increases almost monotonically with k until around
k=10,000, also the point where <knn> turns smaller than k. Beyond this point it is too hard
to find peers with same degrees.
Assortative mixing is not surprising in a campus setting, as people are usually divided
by academic programs and we tend to mostly associate with others in the same programs
and of the same years. For example, freshman students sitting in the same “College Physics”
class likely also take the same “College Chemistry” class. Likewise, PhD students who
attend the same class probably also go to the same academic building for research.
This result confirms the resemblance between human contacts networks and social
networks, as most social networks also have positive assortativity coefficients [104, 103, 107].
It is not surprising, since location proximity often indicates social proximity, and vice
versa [100]. On the other hand, the Internet is shown to have a negative assortativity
coefficient [107], which reflects its hierarchical structure that edges mostly exist between
nodes of different levels (nodes with higher levels have larger degrees). This contrast
confirms that the structure of our human contact network is not hierarchical.
To summarize, the human contact network on the U-M campus bears more resemblance
to social networks than to the Internet. Compared to online social networks, the human
contact network has a less heterogeneous degree distribution. It is also more densely
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connected and locally clustered, as shown in Table 4.2.
4.6 Summary
According to statistics in Section 4.3, the 111 users in the 1am traces are a small
community of people whose contacts are generally a result of work- or study-related co-
location. Most of their contacts occur within a few work/study areas. Their motion patterns
are less concentrated and correlated during nights and weekends. They continue to have
contacts at these times, but with lower frequency.
On the other hand, the U-M dataset involves all (119,055) WiFi devices on the U-M
campus, likely covering a significant portion of the campus population. The 1am dataset is
essentially a subset of the U-M dataset, about 0.1% of the total size. The two datasets show
similar diurnal patterns. Their inter-contact time and contact duration distributions also have
similar shapes, with the larger dataset showing longer inter-contact time and shorter contact
duration. The average contact rate, i.e., number of contacts per pair per hour, of the larger
dataset is about 100X less than the smaller dataset. However, if we only consider pairs with
at least one contact in the larger dataset, the resulting contact rate is almost the same (0.032)
as that of the 1am dataset. This indicates that the 1am dataset is a biased, instead of random,
sample of the U-M dataset. As the 1am dataset are collected from volunteering users of our
1am microblogging application, this dataset likely represents initial user groups of DTN
applications.
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CHAPTER V
Performance and Energy Consumption Analysis of a
Large Scale Delay Tolerant Network for
Censorship-Resistant Communication
5.1 Introduction
Delay Tolerant Networks (DTNs) composed of human carried devices have the potential
to support blocking-, censorship-, and surveillance-resistant communication applications.
Unlike the Internet, the non-hierarchical, device-to-device structure of DTNs makes it
difficult to block, modify, or monitor a large portion of network traffic via attacks on a few
devices.
The demand for the functionality offered by infrastructureless communication systems
is suggested by the response to intentional widespread service disruption for users of social
media applications such as Twitter and Facebook during the Arab Spring [6], ongoing
political censorship in Iran and China, and growing awareness of global surveillance of
individuals without reasonable cause to believe they have committed crimes. Recently in
Hong Kong, in response to the threat of potential denial of service attacks on the Internet-
based Instagram, there were 200,000 downloads of a local mesh networking chat program
called FireChat between 28 and 30 September 2014 [34]. This application supports text
messaging and photo transfer mediated by device-to-device Bluetooth connections [34].
Popular social networking/microblogging services are now commonly censored throughout
much of the world. For example, Twitter is coerced to censor its users on a country-by-
country basis by the threat of punishment by various governments [110]. In response to
this trend, we have evaluated the feasibility, performance, and energy consumption of DTN
systems composed of commodity smartphones and tablets when subjected to random and
targeted denial-of-service and censorship attacks.
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DTNs composed of commodity smartphones and tablets are influenced by constraints
on battery energy, computation speed, and network throughput. We evaluate the potential
of DTNs to support local communication using a flooding protocol variant that avoids
redundant transmissions. Message delivery rates and latencies, as well as battery energy
overheads, are evaluated using two datasets of wireless device-to-device connectivity traces.
The 1am dataset involves 111 users on the University of Michigan campus for the month
of March 2013, and was gathered via an active deployment of a prototype microblogging
application that we developed. The U-M dataset records all 119,055 WiFi devices on the
same campus for the month of April 2015, and was gathered via passive collection of Wifi
association events on the campus WiFi network (See Chapter IV for details).
In summary, we make the following contributions in this chapter.
• Performance: Our analysis indicates that in a college town in which 0.2% of the
population install a DTN app, the system has a median delivery rate of 0.85 after
72 hours and a median delivery delay of 13 hours. When all 119,055 mobile devices
are involved, the campus-wide DTN achieves a message delivery rate of 0.71 after
24 hours, and 0.95 after 72 hours. The median delivery delay is 10.9 hours. We pay
special attention to the system’s performance variations and study their causes.
• Utility: We found that the delivery delays of DTN flooding protocols follow a power
law distribution that varies from hours to days. We compare the distribution of the
network’s message delivery delays with the distributions of user response delays
of various popular online applications, and show that this campus-wide DTN is
appropriate for sharing non-time sensitive information such as Flickr photos and
weblog articles.
• Robustness to denial-of-service and censorship attacks: We found that attacks that
randomly remove 90% of the network participants only reduce delivery rates to the
remaining participants by less than 10%. Targeted attacks, which remove nodes
that have most contacts, were more harmful, causing the delivery rate to decrease
precipitously when half of the participants were removed. However, even when
subjected to targeted attacks, the network only suffered a less than 10% decrease in
delivery rate when 40% of its participants were removed.
• Energy consumption: We analyzed the impact of participating in large scale DTNs
(119,055 nodes) on smartphone battery lifespan. Based on a measurement-based
wireless communication aware smartphone power consumption model, our analysis
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shows that supporting text messages using a naive epidemic flooding protocol con-
sumes 87.5% of a typical smartphone battery in 14 hours. We show that an energy
efficient variant of the epidemic flooding protocol has around 10X decrease in energy
consumption, while keeping comparable message delivery performance. Supporting
text messages using this protocol consumes 13.7% of a typical smartphone battery in
14 hours.
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows. Section 5.3 reports the
measured message delivery performance of the two datasets. In Section 5.4 we study the
robustness of DTNs against random and targeted node failures. Section 5.5 develops a
measurement-based energy model for supporting DTN applications on commodity mobile
devices and reports energy overheads for the two datasets. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes
this chapter.
5.2 Related Work
The idea of using infrastructureless networks to support censorship-resistant communi-
cation is shared by various existing work [111, 43, 27]. Al-Akkad et al. use mobile ad hoc
networks (MANETs) to enable continuous tweet dissemination when network infrastructure
is disrupted [111], which has fewer applications than DTN-based systems because MANETs
require instantaneous end-to-end connections. Hossmann et al. describe a DTN-based
Twitter application for disaster communication. They do not provide evaluation results due
to the lack of contact traces specific to disaster scenarios [43]. Our goal is providing daily
information exchange services in local communities. We therefore use daily human contact
traces to study achievable message delivery performance and energy consumption in such
systems.
Due to the difficulty of collecting large-scale human contact traces, most existing work
on DTNs [33, 95] uses a few existing traces [45, 46] for evaluation. The Dartmouth traces
record the association histories of all participants on Dartmouth College’s campus WiFi
network [45]. Most of the recorded devices are laptops, whose mobility and contact patterns
may differ from smartphones. The UCSD traces were collected around a decade ago from
participants who used experimental PDAs during the deployment [46]. Their traces show a
trend of declining user engagements [46] that is uncommon for normal smartphone users.
Our analysis used two sets of traces we gathered in 2013 and 2015, respectively, through
active installation of measurement software and passive collection of WiFi association
events. They are representative of the mobility and contact patterns of modern smartphone
and laptop users.
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We are unaware of existing measurement-based models for the energy consumption
of common DTN routing protocols or applications. Socievole et al. evaluated the energy
consumption of five DTN routing protocols via simulation [112]. They modeled Bluetooth
communication, while we modeled 802.11 ad hoc communication. In addition, their analysis
considered networks with a maximum size of 200 nodes, while we considered networks
with 119,055 nodes.
Various existing work on improving the energy overhead of DTN flooding protocols
assumes a simple linear relationship between the network’s energy consumption and the
average number of copies per message [113, 114], not considering the cost of learning
each node’s received and not-yet-received messages to avoid redundant transmissions. Our
results show that this cost is a significant contributor of energy overhead, especially in large
networks.
5.3 Message Delivery Performance
In this section we evaluate DTN system’s message delivery performance using two
metrics, message delivery rate, the percentage of intended receivers that have successfully
received a message, and message delivery delay, the elapsed time from message initiation
to its successful delivery.
5.3.1 Methodology
We use epidemic flooding to deliver messages in the network. Specifically, every node
that has received the message transmits it to all its contacts that have not received the
message yet. This produces the shortest path in time between a sender to any other receiver
node on the network. Evaluating the network delivery performance using this protocol
generates an upper performance bound. Note that epidemic flooding does not have optimal
bandwidth overhead, and in congested situations some messages may be forced to follow
circuitous routes, causing performance degradation. However we do not complicate the
problem with bandwidth concern for now and simply assume adequate bandwidth for all
messages.
Instead of implementing and simulating the epidemic flooding protocol on each node,
we algorithmically calculate the shortest path message distribution tree for each initiated
message, according to the contact history of involved nodes. Specifically, we implemented
Dijkstra’s algorithm on the temporal graph of contacts where path lengths represent elapsed
time between contacts.
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In order to fully explore the dynamics of the underlying network, we sample and evaluate
multiple message initiations from different senders and at different times. Our following
analysis is based on the aggregated shortest-path trees associated with all message initiations.
For the 1am dataset, we cause every device in the trace to initiate a message every six
minutes. We do not initiate messages from a particular smartphone when it is inactive, i.e.,
in sleep mode or powered off.
The sampling method for the U-M dataset is more complicated. It would be ideal if we
could simply let every node constantly send messages. However, since the network is huge—
it takes nearly 40 GB to bring all the contacts in memory—and it takes around 20 minutes to
calculate one flooding tree, we cannot afford this large scale simulation. Instead, we first
randomly choose a few initiation days. We then divide each initiation day, plus the day
following it, into half-hour slots and in each slot, repeat the process of randomly choosing
an initiator to send a message. We continuously initiate messages on these chosen days, in
order to capture the daily dynamics of the network. As it turns out, the three initiation days
that we randomly choose is a Tuesday, a Thursday, and a Saturday. For the reported results
in this thesis, we have simulated in total 21,163 messages.
It does not make sense to initiate messages when the device is powered off, and we try
not to. However, it is difficult to infer device sleep times for the U-M dataset, as all we have
is their WiFi association history. We note that a sleeping or powered-off device does not
associate to any APs and long period of disassociation likely indicates sleep or powered-off
state. According to the association traces, the daily maximum disassociation duration from
noon to noon is on average 5 hours. Therefore, we use the following method to infer sleep
or powered-off states; all disassociation periods more than 5 hours are considered to be sleep
or powered-off periods and the device does not initiate messages then.
5.3.2 Overall Performance
Figure 5.2 illustrates the progress of the simulated flooding processes over time for the
U-M dataset. The X-axis shows the elapsed time in hours since message initiation. The
Y-axis shows the delivery rate: the ratio of active nodes that have received the message.
We only show the results for three days, as messages that take more than three days to
deliver are considered outdated. Since we simulated thousands of flooding processes, we use
percentile lines to show their performance distribution. X-percentile line means X-percent of
flooding processes have smaller delivery rates than that of the line. For example, at 12 hours,
following the increasing direction of the Y-axis, the slowest 10% of messages are delivered
to less than 0.25 of the network, messages falling into the 10- to 20-percentile are delivered
to [0.25,0.32) of the network, . . . , and messages in the 70- to 95-percentile are delivered to
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Figure 5.1: 1am’s message delivery rate over time, showing two stages with significantly
different propagation speeds. A point on the X-percentile line represents the X-percentile
delivery rate at the considered time of the flooding processes.
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Figure 5.2: The message delivery performance over time for the U-M dataset. X-axis is
elapsed time in hours. Y-axis is the delivery rate. A X-percentile line means X-percent of
flooding processes have smaller delivery rates than that of the line.
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[0.68, 0.89) of the network. The 50-percentile line shows the median delivery rate of all the
processes. For example, at 12 hours, the median delivery rate is 0.55.
According to our simulation, for the U-M dataset, 24 hours after message initiation, the
average deliver rate is 0.71 and the median is 0.79. The slowest 10% are delivered to less
than 0.4 of their receivers, and quickest 5% are delivered to more than 0.85 of their receivers.
After 72 hours, the average deliver rate is 0.96 and the median is 0.99. Even the slowest 10%
reaches 0.83 of their receivers.
Similarly, Figure 5.1 shows the message delivery performance over time for the 1am
dataset. At 24 h, the median delivery rate is 0.68. The 50th percentile line shows that it takes
a median of 14 hours to reach 60% of participants, 24 hours to reach 70%, and a week to
reach 85%. The fastest-spreading 10% of messages (the 90th percentile line) take 6 hours to
reach 60% of participants, 12 hours to reach 70%, and a week to reach 90%. The slowest
10% of messages (the 10th percentile line) reached almost no other participants, because
10% of participants had no contacts during the study period.
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.1 show surprising consistency in terms of message delivery
performance. Recall that the 1am dataset only includes 111 participants, essentially a small
subgroup containing less than 0.1% of the U-M dataset participants. Despite this huge
difference in network size, the median cases of the two datasets almost have the same
performance. The delivery rates of 1am’s median case at 12, 24, and 72 hours are 0.5, 0.7,
and 0.8, while the numbers for the U-M dataset are 0.55, 0.79, 0.99. The difference is even
smaller if we only consider nodes on the largest connected component as intended receivers;
the largest connected component of the 1am dataset occupies around 90% of the network,
while the number for the U-M dataset is 98.64%.
5.3.3 Performance vs. Adoption Rate
The U-M dataset corresponds to a high adoption rate of DTN applications among the
campus population—recall that the total number of devices in the U-M dataset is twice the
campus population. In this subsection we study the effect of varying adoption rates upon the
network delivery performance.
Figure 5.3 plots the average delivery rate of the U-M dataset versus the adoption rate,
which is varied from 0.2% to 100%. The X-axis is in log scale. We choose subsets according
to a uniform random distribution for any given adoption rate. Figure 5.3 indicates that if the
adoption pattern of the infrastructureless network is purely random, it has difficulty taking
off. As shown by the plot, below a 10% adoption rate the delivery rate increases almost
log-lineally; the network has to grow users like snowballs to only keep a linear increase
in performance. However, we just showed that instead of producing a 0.1 delivery rate as
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Figure 5.3: Average delivery rate as a function of adoption rate.
predicted by Figure 5.3, the 1am dataset, which only corresponds to a 0.1% adoption rate,
has about the same performance as that of the 1 adoption rate case. This is because 1am
participants are not randomly sampled and have more co-location opportunities than random
people on the U-M campus (Section 4.4.1). This observation indicates that we are likely
to have near-optimal performance even in the beginning, if the initial group of users are
physically close to each other.
5.3.4 Performance vs. Initiation Time
We also look into the influence of message initiation time on delivery performance for
the 1am dataset. There is a significant difference between weekday and weekend initiations.
Weekday initiations have a significantly faster delivery; it takes a median of 12 hours to reach
60% of the network on weekdays, compared to 30 hours on weekends. This is consistent with
Figure 4.4 showing that there are significantly more contacts on weekdays than weekends.
There are also significant performance variations by hour-of-day, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.4. The X-axis shows the initiation hour. The Y-axis shows the delivery delay to reach
60% of the network. For example, in the median case (the 50th percentile line), a message
sent at 11 a.m. only takes 10 hours to reach 60% of the network, while another sent at 8 p.m.
takes 21 hours.
In general, the closer before noon a message is initiated, the shorter its delay. The
later after noon a message is initiated, the longer the delay. The shortest delay occurs at
around 12 p.m., and the longest delay occurs at around 7 p.m. This trend is consistent with
1am’s daily contact dynamics. The majority of the contacts occur between 10 a.m. and 6
p.m. (Figure 4.4). Messages initiated before this period have the advantage of using all
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Figure 5.4: Delivery delays (to reach 60% of the network) of messages with different
initiation hours, showing significant variations. A point on the X-percentile line represents
the X-percentile delivery delay of the considered initiation hour.
these contact opportunities. Those initiated after the start of this period have fewer contact
opportunities and longer delays.
5.3.5 Message Delivery Delay and Applications
Figure 5.5 plots the CCDF, i.e., P(X > x), of the message delivery delays of the 1am
dataset in log-log scale. The blue dots in Figure 5.6 show the CDF, i.e., P(X ≤ x), of the
message delivery delays of the U-M dataset in log-log scale. Both distributions follow
power-law. For the U-M dataset, about 22% of messages are delivered within an hour, 74%
of messages are delivered within a day, and only 4% are delivered after 3 days. The median
delay is 10.9 hours. Note that even though we only simulate the first 3 days of message
deliver and therefore do not know the delay distribution of messages delivered after 3 days,
it does not affect the CDF calculation for X ≤ 72.
These delivery delays are in the range of hours, certainly orders of magnitude larger than
the package delivery delays on the Internet, which are usually a few milliseconds. However,
not all hope is lost. Users do not stare at their Facebook news feed, or read weblogs all
day. They check them a couple of times per day, and should be satisfied, as long as the
information arrives before they open the Facebook or weblog page.
To understand whether the performance of our network meets users’ expectations, we
examine the delay between the time of an item generation, e.g., a Facebook post, a Flickr
photo upload, or a blog article post, and that of an access to the item. In particular, we
extracted usage data for four popular applications from published papers.
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• Facebook. An ideal metric would be the delay between when a Facebook post is
shared and its reception of “likes” and comments. However, we did not find public
dataset or published papers on that metric. We found that Bakshy, Rosenn, Marlow,
and Adamic reported the distribution of delays between a link was shared on Facebook
and a friend also shared that link [115]. Note that this is not necessarily reposting the
same link and the friend may have read the link from other channels. The authors did
show that the first post has influence over the friend’s post, and we take this delay as
an approximation as the delay between a post initiation and the audience’s response
time.
• Flickr. Flickr is a photo sharing social network website. Users may “favorite” a photo
by simply clicking a button besides it. Cha, Mislove, and Gummadi reported the
distribution of delays between a photo is uploaded and a user “favorites” it in their
paper [116]. This is exactly the metric we are looking for.
• Twitter. Kwak, Lee, Park, and Moon reported the distribution of the delay between
the original tweet and its retweet [106]. This is exactly the metric we are looking for.
• Weblog. Leskovec, McGlohon, Faloutsos, Glance, and Hurst reported the distribution
of delays between a blog article is posted and other blogs link to it [117]. Note that
this delay might be longer than that between the blog article is posted and a reader
reads it.
We plotted these four distributions in Figure 5.6, to compare them with the message
delivery delay distribution of the U-M pocket switched network. The units for the delays in
Flickr and weblogs are in days, so their curves start with 1 d.
As shown in Figure 5.6, more than 50% of retweets are posted within an hour of the
original tweet post, while our network could only deliver 22% of messages within an hour.
It is therefore evident that our network cannot serve Twitter. On the other hand, most Flickr
favorites (84%) and Weblog links (69%) are created after one day, while our network could
deliver most messages (74%) within one day. Our network could therefore satisfy most
Flickr photo views and blog visits. Lastly, the distributions of Facebook repost delays and
our message deliver delays follow almost the same distribution, especially for regions below
a day. If those two distributions are independent, we have a 50% chance to successfully
serve Facebook users. Note this probability might become larger than 0.5 if the frequency
that a user checks a friend’s Facebook updates declines with their distance, since delivery
delays on our network increases with distance.
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Figure 5.7: Contact number distributions of different-stage receivers in the 1am dataset,
showing a transition at 0.6 delivery rate. A point on the X-percentile line represents the
X-percentile contact number of receivers reached at the considered stage.
5.3.6 Delivery Speed
As shown in Figure 5.1, the message propagation speed (the slope of the percentile lines)
of the 1am dataset clearly show two stages. To reach the first 60% of participants it takes
3 hours for every 10% of progress, but it becomes increasingly difficult to reach the rest of
the participants. For example, the median case (the 50th percentile line) takes only 18 hours
to progress from 0% to 60%, but 50 hours to progress from 60% to 80%. The power-law
distribution of delivery delays in Figure 5.5 also illustrates this phenomenon.
To explain this change in propagation speed and understand why it takes so long to reach
the last 40% of participants, we examine the difference in contact numbers for receivers
reached in different stages of the flooding processes. Different flooding processes have
different propagation speeds. Therefore, we did not use absolute elapsed time to quantify
a receiver’s stage. For example, 9 h is late in a flooding process that finishes in 10 hours,
but is early in another one that finishes in 100 hours. To define a metric independent of
propagation speed, we order the receivers in each flooding process by their reception times
and set the stage of a receiver based on its comparative order, i.e., the delivery rate upon
that receiver’s message reception. We aggregate same-stage receivers of all the flooding
processes and show their contact number distributions in Figure 5.7. The X-axis shows the
stages of receivers using delivery rates. The Y-axis is a node’s total number of contacts
during the study period. As there are multiple nodes at the same stage, we use percentile
lines to show their contact number distributions.
There is a clear change in trend at the stage associated with 60% delivery rate. Below
that, the contact number distributions are almost constant. Above that, the number of
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contacts per node decreases dramatically. This is consistent with Figure 5.1, which shows a
constant propagation speed before reaching 60% delivery rate, and a decreasing speed after
that. This result suggests that diminishing contact opportunities prolong delivery delays for
the last 40% nodes.
In summary, due to the participants’ differences in contact opportunities, the 1am com-
munication system has two stages in its delivery performance. It has a constant propagation
speed (3 hours per 10% progress) for the first 60% of the participants, who are well con-
nected with each other. It is increasingly difficult to reach the remaining nodes, which have
fewer and fewer contacts. Overall, with a message lifetime of one week, the system has a
median delivery rate of 0.85 and a median delivery delay of 13 hours.
5.3.7 Summary on Message Delivery Performance
To shortly summarize, a community scale DTN composed of people’s own mobile
devices—such as the one covering the UM campus—delivers most messages within a few
hours to one or two days, and it is most appropriate for sharing information that is not time
sensitive, e.g., blog articles and photos. It is not good for pushing highly time sensitive news
to the whole community, e.g., Twitter news.
5.4 Robustness
As a natural consequence of their distributed, non-hierarchical structures, DTNs are
robust to blocking and censorship accomplished by removing or controlling network re-
sources. Evaluating a network’s robustness to resource removal can be used to determine its
robustness to both attacks. The relationship between resource removal and blocking (denial-
of-service) attacks is straightforward; an attacker might eliminate smartphones, perhaps via
malware or by jamming their wireless signals at specific locations. The relationship with
censorship is slightly more complex; censorship can be seen as a selective form of resource
removal. Because censorship requires control over network devices, or their communication
channels, a network structure robust to resource removal is also robust to censorship.
Resistance to attacks in which many network participants simultaneously and rapidly
inject messages requires additional consideration. Non-hierarchical networks remain vulner-
able to such denial-of-service attacks. However, resisting them is possible. For example,
recall that 1am microblogging application where messages are signed using the private keys
of the sending identities. It is practical for receiving mobile devices to detect when particular
identities are sending messages at an undesirable rate and then cease forwarding them. An
attacker might conceivably adopt a new identity and use it to launch an attack. That strategy
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can be defeated by assigning higher priorities to messages from nodes that have previously
sent messages of interest.
Increasing the cost of surveillance is a secondary goal. In many applications messages
are public by design, e.g., blogs. However, there remains value in increasing the cost of
reprisal-oriented network surveillance, e.g., associating messages with senders or receivers,
or associating identities with individuals. The use of a non-hierarchical device-to-device
network has the potential to increase the cost of reprisal-oriented surveillance because it
requires a physical presence throughout a large portion of the network to observe enough
traffic to associate senders and receivers. Associating identities with messages is also
expensive because attackers would require a widespread physical presence, perhaps capable
of wireless signal triangulation, to determine the location of the mobile device originating a
particular message.
5.4.1 Attacks
We consider DTN performance when subjected to attacks which remove participating
devices. These attacks prevent specific network nodes from transmitting or relaying specific
(censorship) or all (blocking) messages, e.g., through malware deployment, physical attacks,
or wireless signal jamming. Two specific strategies are considered. The first one, “random
device removal”, disables devices at random, and the second one, “targeted device removal”,
disables devices in order of their importance. More important devices have more contacts
with other devices.
We also consider another class of attacks that disrupt physically local communications,
e.g., via radio jamming on 802.11 frequencies [118], for the 1am dataset1. We call this
“location removal attacks” because it disables all communication within a local area, or
location. We defined a location to be a 100 m×100 m grid element, i.e., a region with an
area similar to that covered by an 802.11b transmitter. Only “targeted location removal” is
discussed because “random location removal” is less effective and we believe intelligent
attackers would be capable of identifying important locations, i.e., ones with most contact
occurrences.
We simulated the effects of both classes of attacks by recalculating the message delivery
performance when subject to them. In the case of device removal attacks, all contacts
involving the affected devices are removed. In the case of location removal attacks, all
contacts occurring within the affected locations are removed.
1We did not simulate this attack for the U-M dataset as it contains no location information.
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Figure 5.8: The change of average delivery rates during random and targeted node removals
for the U-M dataset.
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Figure 5.9: Degradation of message delivery rates under resource removal attacks for the
1am dataset. “Random node removal” has almost no effect. “Targeted node removal” is the
most effective. Under “targeted node removal”, the Internet is fragmented much faster than
the 1am network.
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5.4.2 Attack Performance: Delivery Rate
Figure 5.8 shows the change of delivery rates during random and targeted node removals
for the U-M dataset. Y-axis is the average delivery rate after 72 hours. As illustrated, random
removal has almost no effect on the network delivery rate until 90% of nodes are removed.
After that the network disintegrates and the delivery rate quickly falls to zero. On the other
hand, targeted removal is more “effective” and it causes the network performance to degrade
earlier. Under targeted removal, the network delivery rate starts to noticeably degrade after
around 40% of high-degree nodes are removed. However, the degradation is much slower
compared to the degradation of random removal after 0.9.
One possible explanation for this slow degradation follows. Because human contact
networks are highly assortative and locally clustered, removing nodes in descending order of
their degrees gradually breaks the network into smaller and smaller communities. The con-
nectivity within each community is still preserved. On the other hand, randomly removing
nodes does not affect the structure of the network, but it affects communities on all levels.
Once enough nodes are removed, all communities break down at the same time.
Figure 5.9 shows how attacks affect message delivery rates for the 1am dataset, very
similar with the U-M dataset. Random device removal has almost no effect on delivery rates
until more than 80% of devices are removed, while targeted removal attacks more quickly
impact delivery rates. Note that the targeted device removal and targeted location removal
have similar impact with the first being slightly more effective.
Comparing Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9 leads to an interesting observation that the 1am
network and the U-M network have almost similar reactions to random and targeted node
removals. In addition, recall that their message delivery performances are also similar. These
observations suggest structural similarities between the larger human contact network and
the smaller one sampled from a smaller location.
5.4.3 Attack Performance: Delay
Figure 5.10 shows the median delivery delay under random and targeted node removals
for the U-M dataset. As illustrated, random removal has no effect on delivery delays until
around 80% of nodes are removed. This is similar to its effect on delivery rate. On the
other hand, targeted removal has immediate influence over delays. The speed of degradation
increases when more than 40% of most connected nodes are removed.
The attacks have similar effects on the 1am dataset, as shown in Figure 5.11. It is
interesting that contrary to its impact on delivery rate, targeted location removal has a larger
impact on message delivery latency than does targeted device removal. The following
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Figure 5.10: The change of median delivery delays during random and targeted node
removals for the U-M dataset.
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Figure 5.11: Degradation of message delivery delay under resource removal attacks for the
1am dataset. Again, “Random node removal” has almost no effect. Both targeted removal
attacks are more effective, with “targeted location removal” resulting in faster delay increase.
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explanation is consistent with our observations. When a location is removed, it is likely
that devices will meet in other locations to complete the delivery process with higher delay.
In contrast, when a node is removed, this can terminate further distribution of messages,
resulting in reduced in delivery rates, without reducing the delivery delays of the remaining
messages.
5.4.4 Comparison to the Internet
We are interested in comparing the performance degradation of our DTNs and the
Internet when subject to resource removal attacks. Albert, Jeong, and Barabasi studied the
fragmentation of the Internet when its routers are removed randomly and in descending
order of edge numbers [12]. They quantity network fragmentation using the relative size
of the largest cluster, which is an upper bound of the network’s average delivery rate. We
therefore plotted Internet fragmentation as a function of the percent of removed routers from
their paper, in direct comparison with the degradation results of our DTNs.
As shown in the inset plot of Figure 5.8, compared to the Internet, the U-M network is
more robust under both random and targeted node removals. For example, under targeted
removal, the Internet breaks down when less than 5% of its most connected routers are
removed, while the U-M network has to wait until more than 40% of its most connected
participants are removed. A possible explanation is the U-M network is less heterogeneous
than the Internet (recall Section 4.5.1). Note that we do not claim that the U-M network is
more robust than the Internet under attacks of the same scale, because it may be more difficult
to eliminate or compromise 5% of resources on the Internet than on the 1am network.
5.4.5 Summary and Discussion
Our analysis shows that it is ineffective to block or censor DTN communications by
randomly removing network resources, unless the majority (more than 90%) of the resources
are removed. It is more effective to target the most important resources, i.e., devices with
numerous contacts and locations where many contacts occur. Even using this strategy, it
is necessary to eliminate a large percentage of the 1am network, relative to a hierarchical
network. The Internet is fragmented when less than 5% of its most critical routers are
removed, while the 1am network does not degrade rapidly until more than 40% of its devices
or locations are removed. Eliminating 40% of network devices, or radio jamming 40% of
the public areas in a town or campus is likely to be an expensive undertaking for an attacker.
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Table 5.1: Power Model Parameters
Meaning Value
N Network size Deployment dependent
E f
Energy cost of send+receive 26.4 mJone 802.11b frame
fm
Message initiation Message type dependent
frequency (see Table 5.4)
Fm
# of 802.11b frames Message type dependent
per message (see Table 5.4)
Bframe # of data bits per frame 4095×8/2
Rcontact
Avg. # of contacts 0.00025
per pair per hour (U-M trace)
5.5 Energy Model
This section describes an energy model for supporting DTN applications on commodity
smartphones and describes the relationship between battery depletion and network scale.
We first develop an energy model for the WiFi component in 802.11 ad hoc mode based
on measurements, then elaborate on the three contributors to energy consumption for DTN
applications: contact discovery, communication, and computation. For the convenience of
the readers, Table 5.1 lists a few parameters frequently used throughout this section.
We use a Monsoon power monitor [119] to measure power consumption. The devices
used for power modeling are rooted Samsung Galaxy Nexus smartphones running Cyanogen-
Mod 10.2.1-toro (Android 4.3.1). The wireless chip of these devices is Broadcom BCM4330.
The CPU is a Dual-Core 1.2 GHz ARM Cortex-A9.
5.5.1 WiFi Component in 802.11 Ad hoc Mode
We measure the smartphone’s power consumption for different packet transmission
frequencies. The experimental setup follows. Two devices are put into 802.11b ad hoc mode
and a 2 Mbps communication channel is established. One device uses the “ping” program to
send periodic ICMP packets, which are padded into maximum 802.11b frames. We measure
the power consumption of the other device, which is placed in sleep mode with only the
WiFi component awake. The ping frequency ( fping) is varied from 0.1 Hz to 100 Hz.
We observe clear changes in wireless interface power management states as fping changes.
When fping < 0.5 Hz, the WiFi component switches on and off for each frame and consumes
significant energy, as the energy cost for one power state switch is much larger than that for
one send/receive operation. When fping > 1 Hz, the WiFi component stays in the high power
state. From 0.5 Hz to 1 Hz, the frequency of power state switches gradually decreases, and
99
Table 5.2: Operation/State Dependent WiFi Power
Pidle (idle state) 210 mW
Phigh (send/receive state) 341 mW
Esw (one power state switch from low-high-low) 242 mJ
Eping (send+receive one 802.11b frame (ping)) 2.16 mJ
Esend (send one 802.11b frame (UDP)) 19.6 mJ
Erecv (receive one 802.11b frame (UDP)) 6.8 mJ
we see a decreasing power consumption despite the increase in ping frequency. Based on
this result, we use a conservative two-stage model for the WiFi component. Send/receive
operations separated by more than one second cause power state switches. In other words,
the device stays in the high power state until there is a gap between operations longer than
one second.
Table 5.2 summarizes the measured energy numbers for different power states and
operations. Note that we also measured the energy cost of sending/receiving one (maximum)
802.11b frame through an application program operating UDP sockets (Esend and Erecv), as
these numbers are more relevant for application energy modeling.
5.5.2 Ongoing Contact Discovery
In order to avoid relying on centralized control and scheduling, we used Zheng’s and
Hou’s asynchronous activation algorithm [120] to check for contact opportunities peri-
odically. The activation pattern within each period is deliberately designed so that two
unsynchronized devices have overlapping activation times. The authors showed that it is
possible to achieve a 9/73 duty cycle [120]. Therefore, the hourly energy cost for contact
discovery is Ebase = Pidle · 3, 600 seconds · 973 , where Pidle is the idle power consumption
for staying awake in 802.11 ad hoc mode, the minimal power state in which devices could
discover each other.
5.5.3 Communication
Communication happens upon each contact, causing the following sequence of opera-
tions. The two devices first switch into the high power state, then exchange Bloom filters to
learn about each other’s received and not-yet-received messages, then deliver the not-yet-
received messages, and finally switch back into the low-power state. The communication
energy consumption is therefore the sum of the Bloom filter exchange (we also call it
metadata exchange) and message delivery energy consumptions.
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5.5.3.1 Message Delivery Cost
All messages are flooded to the whole network, so the number of messages received
per node per hour is the total number of messages generated by the network per hour,
N fmFm. fm is the message initiation frequency (in 1/hour) and N is the number of nodes in
the network. Fm is the number of 802.11b frames each message consumes (see Table 5.4
for typical message sizes). Therefore, the hourly energy cost for message delivery is
Emsg = E f (N fmFm). E f is the energy cost of sending and receiving one maximum size
802.11b frame, E f = Esend + Erecv.
5.5.3.2 Metadata Exchange Cost
The metadata of each node’s received messages that are still alive are recorded in Bloom
filters—recall that DTN messages have a limited lifetime, e.g., we set it to three days in the
U-M simulation. We now derive the size of each node’s Bloom filter. Each node receives in
total N fm · 12 hours · 3 days · Fm messages per week, as we assume 12 hours of active time
per day for initiating messages. Each message requires 14.4 bits in the Bloom filter (recall
Section 4.2.2), so the size of each node’s Bloom filter (measured in 802.11b frames) is
14.4 b·(N fm·12 h·3 d·Fm)
Bframe
, where Bframe is the maximum number of data bits carried by one 802.11b
frame.
As each node’s Bloom filter is exchanged upon each contact, the energy cost per contact
is E f
14.4 b·(N fm·36 h·Fm)
Bframe
+ Esw. The extra term Esw is the energy cost of switching on and off the
WiFi component to enable communication (see Table 5.2). On the other hand, each node’s
average contacts per hour is NRcontact, as Rcontact is the average number of contacts per pair
per hour. Therefore, each node’s hourly cost for metadata exchange is
Emd = NRcontact
(
E f
14.4 b · (N fm · 36 h · Fm)
Bframe
+ Esw
)
.
Overall, the hourly communication energy cost per node is Ecomm = Emsg + Emd, which
scales with N2 as Emd scales with N2 and Emsg scales with N.
5.5.4 Computation
The computation cost is the energy cost for handling received DTN messages at the
application layer, which includes the cost of signing, verification, and all other operations,
e.g., serialization/deserialization and database queries and insertions2. Each node’s hourly
2In fact signing is only conducted once by the message initiator while every receiver verifies. We simplified
the model by assuming that signing and verification occur the same number of times, leading to an upper
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Table 5.3: Energy Cost of 1am Computations
Execution time for Energy cost
5,000 runs (ms) per run (mJ)
Signature (OpenSSL) 741.9 [121] 0.1
Verification (OpenSSL) 3819.7 [121] 0.6
Verification (SpongeCastle) 1,572,347 239
Others 65,776 10.0
energy cost for computation is Ecomp = N fmEmcomp, where N fm is the number of messages
received per node per hour, and Emcomp is the energy cost of processing one message. We
plugged in the measurement results for 1am, the DTN microblogging application that we
developed, in this model.
Table 5.3 lists the computation time and energy cost for various message handling
operations3. For digital signature and verification, 1am uses ECDSA with nistp256 for their
space-friendly public keys [122]. Unfortunately Android’s default cryptography library,
SpongeCastle [123], is much less energy efficient (2,000× less) than an unsupported native
library, OpenSSL [124] (see Table 5.3). Because it is non-trivial to port OpenSSL to
Android and measure its performance, we used a previous paper’s reported computation
time for the considered algorithm parameters, CPU model, and OS [121]. In summary,
Emcomp = 0.1 mJ + 0.6 mJ + Fm · 10.0 mJ, for signing, verification, and other operations,
respectively. The cost for all operations except signing and verification is proportional to the
message size, as reflected in the last term of Emcomp.
Summing the cost of contact discovery, communication, and computation yields 1am’s
total hourly energy cost
E = Ebase + Ecomm + Ecomp, (5.1)
which scales in O(N2), as Ebase is constant, Ecomp is O(N), and Ecomm is O(N2). Note that
this model assumes an uniform pairwise contact rate (Rcontact) independent of the network
size (N). In reality, Rcontact may decrease as N increases, offsetting the O(N2) trend, because
an increasing number of nodes may never meet as the network becomes larger and more
geographically distributed.
5.5.5 Energy Cost for Supporting the U-M Network
Using the energy model in Equation 5.1, we estimate the per device energy cost to support
the U-M DTN with 119,055 devices. We consider three types of multimedia messages with
bound cost estimation.
3The energy cost is the product of the computation time and PCPU , the smartphone’s power level with CPU
being awake, which is 760 mW according to our measurement.
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Table 5.4: Message Sizes (Fm) and Initiation Frequencies ( fm)
Type Message size Fm fm(frames/msg.) (msg./hour)
Text 514 characters 1 0.16667
Image 100 KB 44 0.02536
Video clip 1 Mbps × 240 seconds 12000 0.00054
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Figure 5.12: Average hourly energy consumption per device on the U-M network for text,
image, and video messages.
different sizes (measured in 802.11b frames) and message initiation frequencies ( fm), as
shown in Table 5.4. We consider 1am text messages that contain at most 514 characters, so
one frame per text message is sufficient. The text initiation frequency is based on Twitter’s
average rate, around 2 per user per day [125]. We consider images of sizes typical for
microblogging applications, 100 KB. The image initiation frequency is based on Facebook
users’ photo posting statistics [126]. We consider 352×288 video encoded at 1 Mbps, i.e.,
high-quality MPEG, of 4 minutes duration, the average video length on the Internet [127].
The video initiation frequency is based on YouTube’s statistics [128].
The blank bars in Figure 5.12 shows the resulting average hourly energy consumption
for supporting the U-M network. The Y-axis is in log scale. The unit on the Y-axis is ratio
of a 6.48 Wh battery, a typical battery for mobile devices nowadays. “Base” represents the
cost for contact discovery (Ebase), “Metadata” represents the cost for running the epidemic
flooding protocol, i.e., exchanging metadata on received messages upon contacts (Ecomm),
and “Message” represents the cost of handling the actual messages (Ecomp).
As illustrated, on a DTN with around 120,000 devices, using an epidemic flooding
routing protocol, supporting text messages costs a hourly depletion of 6.25% of a typical
smartphone battery. Image messages cost 27.5% of the battery per hour and video messages
103
cost 155% of the battery per hour. Note that these numbers are far smaller than what we
predicted in a previous paper, which used an hourly contact rate Rcontact = 0.0329 based
on the 1am dataset [57]. In fact, the average contact rate per pair on the U-M network
(Rcontact = 0.00025) is about 100X smaller than that of the 1am dataset, indicating that
people do not meet everyone else with the same probability. This result also indicates that
instead of scaling in O(N2), as predicted pessimistically by Equation 5.1, energy overhead
likely scales much slower with the network size N, because the total number of contacts per
device does not scale linearly with the network size.
Nevertheless, these energy overheads are non-negligible, possibly unacceptable for
smartphone users, as even for the most undemanding text messages, running this application
alone depletes more than half of the battery in eight hours. We observe that epidemic
flooding is the most resource-consuming routing protocol and this is an upper bound on
energy consumption. Since most messages only have a small number of receivers, e.g., the
average number of friends that receive a Facebook post is less than 200 [103], more energy
efficient protocols should be used in practice.
We consider a variant of the epidemic flooding protocol, the probabilistic flooding
protocol [129, 130], for example. According to this protocol instead of relaying every
message, a node decides independently with probability p whether to relay a message. As
shown in Figure 5.8 (random removal), the network has almost the same performance even
if only 10% of randomly chosen nodes are functioning. This indicates that a probabilistic
flooding protocol with p = 0.1 performs as good as the epidemic flooding protocol.
This indication may not be immediately obvious as Figure 5.8 only plots the message
delivery performance for the 10% functioning nodes. An informal proof follows. Consider
a random node ni who is not among the group of functioning nodes, i.e., ni only receives
messages that she is interested in but never retransmits them. Let’s denote the size of
the functioning group |F|. Now if we add ni into the functioning group, the size of the
functioning group becomes |F| + 1. As we have shown in Figure 5.8, the message delivery
performance of these two cases with |F| and |F| + 1 functioning nodes, should be almost
identical. Therefore, in the case where ni is functioning, its probability and delay of receiving
the message follows the same distributions of reception probabilities and delays as that of
the functioning nodes in the case of the size-|F| functioning group. Finally, since whether
and when ni receives the message is not affected by whether it retransmits, in the real case
where ni does not function, its reception probability and delay follows the same distributions
of reception probabilities and delays as that of the |F| functioning nodes.
The bars filled with slashes in Figure 5.12 shows the average hourly energy consumption
for the probabilistic flooding protocol with p = 0.1. The energy consumption is about 10
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times less as each node now only handles 1/10 of the messages generated on the network.
Specifically, supporting text messages costs a hourly depletion of 0.98% of a typical smart-
phone battery, which translates into 14% of the battery in 14 hours and is acceptable. Image
messages cost 3.09% of the battery per hour, which translates into 42% of the battery in
14 hours. The video messages cost 15.9% per hour, which is not acceptable for sure. More
energy efficient routing protocols are needed in the last two cases.
5.6 Conclusions
Thanks to their structure, DTNs composed of commodity smartphones have the potential
to resist blocking and censorship, and make surveillance expensive. Such networks are
capable of supporting text microblogging applications without much reducing participant
smartphones’ battery lifespan for towns with populations of 119,055. Supporting frequent
image or video distribution without new dissemation ideas is impractical at similar network
scales. The network was able to deliver messages to most participants within a day with
only in a college town with 119,055 participating devices. It degrades more gracefully than
a hierarchical infrastructure network when subjected to attacks that eliminate participants or
geographic locations, suggesting robustness to blocking and censorship.
There is evidence of substantial demand for communication applications that are robust
to blocking, censorship, and surveillance but developing such applications requires an under-
standing of how design decisions influence performance, security, and energy consumption
properties. This work takes a first step toward this understanding.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusions
In this thesis we exploit the idea of connecting people’s commodity mobile devices,
e.g., smartphones and laptops, into distributed Delay Tolerant Networks, in order to provide
useful, practical, secure, and censorship-resistant information exchange services to local
communities, e.g., a university campus or a town. In particular, our research focuses on
studying the utility and practicality, as well as robustness and security of these networks.
6.1 Utility and Practicality
Based on simulation results with real human mobility and contact traces involving
119,055 mobile devices on a university campus that we collected, the largest device connec-
tivity traces to the best of our knowledge, we found it is practical to use DTNs composed
of commodity mobile devices to exchange non-time-sensitive information within local
communities, e.g., blog articles and photos.
Utility: It takes a median of 10.9 hours to exchange information between user pairs in a
large-scale DTN covering a university town (the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
The delays follow a power-law distribution and vary from minutes to a few days.
Although these numbers are far larger than what we usually expect on the Internet,
i.e., a few milliseconds, direct comparison between this network’s message delivery delay
distribution and user response delay distributions of various popular online applications
shows that this network could delivery most photos to Flickr users before they “like” the
photos, and most blog articles to webblog users before they link the articles. However, it
cannot push Tweets quick enough to beat Twitter users’ reply delays. To summarize, these
networks are useful for exchanging information that is not time sensitive, e.g., blog articles
and photos.
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Practicality: The energy overhead for participating in this large scale DTN is moderate,
e.g., supporting text messages consumes about 14% of a typical smartphone battery
in 14 hours.
There are some limitations regarding our evaluation methodology and interesting discov-
eries that may lead to promising future work,
• Our contact traces are extracted from WiFi association record using the following
heuristics common in the DTN research community—devices that are associated with
the same WiFi access points have direct connectivity. This may result in connections
that do not exist. More importantly, this method cannot capture connections between
devices that are associated with different access points. As a result, large connected
regions covered by multiple access points may be artificially fragmented into various
smaller regions. It is unclear how much this deviation influences our performance
estimation and whether correcting it will greatly improve the network performance.
• We used a flooding protocol to analyze the best message delivery delay performance
of the network, assuming unrealistically unlimited bandwidth. Understanding the
bandwidth capacity of this network, i.e., what is the maximum average bandwidth that
each device could inject new information into the network without causing circuitous
routes, is important to deepen our understanding of the practicality of DTN systems.
• We have found surprising consistency between the performances of the two datasets
we collected, the 1am dataset and the U-M dataset, with the former containing a subset
of devices being around 1% of the devices in the latter dataset. On the other hand,
the 1am dataset performs very differently from a randomly sampled 1% subset of the
U-M dataset. This suggests structural similarities of human communities in different
scales that may lead to interesting future work.
• Although it is practical to support text messages on the proposed networks, image
messages cost 3.09% of a typical smartphone battery per hour, translating into 42%
of the battery in 14 hours. Video messages cost 15.9% per hour, which is even more
unacceptable. More energy efficient routing protocols than epidemic flooding are
needed to support the last two message types.
6.2 Robustness and Security
Based on simulation results with the large scale device connectivity traces that we
collected, we have confirmed that DTNs composed of commodity mobile devices are
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robust to random node failures and intentional censorship or blocking attacks.
Robustness: Attacks that randomly remove 90% of the network participants only reduce
delivery rates to the remaining participants by less than 10%. Targeted attacks, which
remove nodes that have most contacts, were more harmful, causing the delivery rate
to decrease precipitously when 60% of the participants were removed. However, even
when subjected to targeted attacks, the network only suffered a less than 10% decrease
in delivery rate when 40% of its participants were removed.
Although structurally robust, the openness of the proposed network introduces numerous
security concerns since participants are not vetted. Ensuring security is further complicated
because the system is distributed, without any central point of trust. The Sybil attack, for
example, is an especially dangerous attack in distributed systems as it breaks the assumption
underlying majority voting. Our work on defeating the Sybil attack lays a foundation
for designing security mechanisms on DTNs composed of commodity mobile devices
without requiring mutual trust between participating devices. In particular,
Security: We designed the Mason test, a practical protocol for Sybil defense in wireless ad
hoc networks of nodes without mutual trust. The Mason test provides full separation of
Sybil and non-Sybil identities, under the condition that conforming nodes outnumber
physical attacking nodes.
The robustness and security of the proposed network relies on an unspoken assumption
that it is difficult to gain access and control of people’s smartphones and laptops in large scale.
However, large scale malware installations may be possible, especially given the current
monopoly in mobile OS and hardware manufacturers. Depending on specific purposes
and thread models of upper-layer applications, secure system designs and implementations
require further efforts from application designers, as well as the open source community.
6.3 Prospect
Despite the progress we made in this thesis in confirming the practicality and robustness
of infrastructureless networks comprising commodity mobile devices, the lack of a killer
application remains the largest barrier to the launch of these networks. FireChat was the
most successful application on infrastructureless networks in recent years, but its usage
seems to have silently faded after the “Umbrella Revolution”. We encourage interested
researchers and practitioners to continue the search of useful and influential applications.
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APPENDIX A
Extending Channel Comparison Based Sybil Detection to
MIMO Systems
A.1 Introduction
Wireless channel comparison based Sybil defense techniques have been shown effec-
tive [1, 2, 74, 79, 131]. By comparing wireless channel conditions one may determine
whether two (or more) transmissions originated from the same location and are thus likely
to be part of a Sybil attack. The technique is based on the location uniqueness of wireless
channels, i.e., even slightly different transmission locations experience uncorrelated wireless
channel conditions [72].
Wireless channel comparison based Sybil defenses fall into the class of resource testing
based Sybil defenses [63, 64]. In this case transmitter antennas are the resource. Specifically,
a group of Sybil transmissions are detected because they demonstrate much less use of
antennas (and thus much less wireless channel variations) than the same number of protocol-
compliant transmissions.
Existing channel comparison techniques assume single input, single output (SISO) radio
systems [1, 2, 74, 79, 131]. In this report we make an initial attempt to extend them to
multi-input multi-output (MIMO) systems, which are becoming increasingly popular [80,
132]. Our approach also follows resource testing; we examine received signals to identify
transmissions that demonstrate inadequate resource use, or more precisely, to identify
numerous transmissions from the same device that claim to be coming from different
identities.
Before going into technical details, we will present a mathematical model for MIMO
systems and give an intuitive explanation for our technique.
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Figure A.1: A MIMO system with nT transmitters and nR receivers.
A.1.1 Mathematical Model of MIMO Systems
Figure A.1 illustrates a general MIMO system with nT transmitters and nR receivers.
Note that the transmitters and receivers may or may not belong to the same MIMO antenna
array. Assuming flat-fading or narrowband channels—which is a common practice, this
system is modeled as
y = Hx + n. (A.1)
All numbers here are in complex space. The nT -dimensional vector x represents the transmit-
ted signals and the nR-dimensional vector y represents the received signals. n is the additive
white noise. H ∈ CnR×nT is the channel matrix, where Hi, j represents the channel from the
jth transmitter to the ith receiver [132]. Note that H characterizes the wireless channels
between the transceivers and is purely determined by the surrounding environment.
Equation A.1 can be expanded as
y =
nT∑
j=1
h jx j + n, (A.2)
showing that the received signals of a given MIMO system fall in the column space of its
channel matrix H. Since the channel matrix H is determined by the environment and a Sybil
attacker can only change the transmitted signals (x js) to create Sybil transmissions, this
means all these Sybil transmissions fall into the same dimension nT (at maximum) linear
subspace of CnR . On the other hand, transmissions originated from different MIMO devices
fall into different linear subspaces because the corresponding channel matrices vary due to
the spatial variations among wireless channels. We thus could decide whether a group of
transmissions are originated from the same MIMO system (and thus Sybil) by observing the
linear subspace they span. This is the basic observation of our Sybil detection technique.
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In the remaining parts of the appendix, we first establish a basic assumption for channel
matrix H in Section A.2. We then proceed to tackle the particular Sybil detection problem.
Section A.3 formally sets up the problem. Section A.4 then develops the observations and
techniques for Sybil detection. Finally, Section A.5 discusses practical considerations and
future work.
A.2 Channel Matrix Properties
We have shown that the channel matrix H plays a critical role in the formation of received
signals. Viewing each element Hi, j (i.e., the wireless channel from the jth transmitter to the
ith receiver) as a random variable, Conjecture 1 establishes a basic assumption for H.
Conjecture 1. The channel matrix of a MIMO system has full rank if its wireless channels
are all independently distributed.
According to existing results, the probability that a square random matrix with all
independent entries is singular quickly approaches zero when its size increases, and equals
zero asymptotically [133, 134]. Conjecture 1 neglects this small probability and assumes
a non-singular matrix for finite size random matrices, mainly for the ease of theoretical
development. The rare singular cases do not invalidate our method, but do affect the
performance negatively. We will leave the analysis to future experimental evaluations.
A.3 Problem Setup
A set of MIMO devices observe the wireless transmissions from another set of MIMO
devices. The observing devices have nR receiver antennas in total. There are two type of
devices. Conforming devices only make one transmission each; we call these transmissions
non-Sybil transmissions. Attacking devices make more than one transmissions each, and we
call these transmissions Sybil transmissions. Our goal is to detect all the Sybil transmissions.
It is important to distinguish among two types of Sybil transmissions. If the number
of Sybil transmissions an attacker makes is less than or equal to its number of transmitter
antennas, then these Sybil transmissions are called undetectable Sybil transmissions. Oth-
erwise, if the number of Sybil transmissions an attacker makes is greater than its number
of transmitter antennas, these Sybil transmissions are called detectable Sybil transmissions.
It will become evident in Section A.4 that we are only able to identify detectable Sybil
transmissions.
The following conditions are necessary for a wireless channel comparison based Sybil
defense to work.
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Condition 4. An attacking device is stationary during its Sybil transmissions.
Condition Condition 4 is necessary because free device motion allows Sybil transmis-
sions to experience different wireless channels. It is implicitly assumed by all previous
channel comparison based Sybil defenses. We proposed a method to detect device motion,
in case restricting it is impossible (see Section 2.7).
Condition 5. The total number of receivers nR is larger than the number of transmitters on
any single attacking device.
Condition Condition 5 upper bounds the number of transmitters per device by nR. NT
denotes the maximum number of transmitters per attacking device.
The following assumptions create an ideal world to simplify explanation and theoretical
development.
1. All the wireless channels in the MIMO system are independent.
2. There is no noise in the system, i.e., n = 0 in Equation A.1 and Equation A.2.
In reality both assumptions can be relaxed. For the first one, our method works as long
as wireless channels from different MIMO devices are independent, which is commonly
true thanks to the rich spatial variations of wireless channels [72]. For the second one, we
leave it to future experiments to quantify the actual noise threshold.
A.4 Sybil Detection
Section A.1 suggested that we could detect a group of Sybil transmissions by observing
that they demonstrate much less wireless channel variations and thus fewer transmitter
antennas than a group of non-Sybil transmissions with equal size. In this section we detail
the properties that allow us to make this distinction.
Lemma 6. The received signals of any group of no more than b nRNT c non-Sybil transmissions
are linearly independent.
Proof. Use n to denote the total number of transmitters involved. n ≤ nR because the total
number of transmissions is no more than b nRNT c and each of them involves NT transmitters at
maximum.
Use H to represent a MIMO system with all these transmissions’ transmitters and the
given receivers. H can be written as
H =
(
h1 h2 ... hn
)
,
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where hi denotes the vector of wireless channels from the i-th transmitter to all the nR
receivers.
We now prove his are linearly independent. Since all the wireless channels in H are
independent (see the first assumption in Section A.3), according to Conjecture 1 H has full
rank. Furthermore, since H’s column size is smaller than or equal to its row size (n ≤ nR),
the columns of H are linearly independent.
Finally, the received signals are linearly independent because they are linear combina-
tions of his. 
Corollary 1. It requires (the received signals of) at least b nRNT c non-Sybil transmissions to
linearly expand (the received signal of) a non-Sybil transmission.
Corollary 1 is just a restatement of Lemma Lemma 6. Because a group of Sybil
transmissions only correspond to less (or equal) independent channel vectors than a group
of non-Sybil transmissions of the same size, Corollary 1 can be generalized as follows.
Corollary 2. It requires (the received signals of) at least b nRNT c transmissions to linearly
expand (the received signal of) a non-Sybil transmission.
So far Corollary 2 describes the features of non-Sybil transmissions. On the other hand,
the following lemma describes the features of Sybil transmissions.
Lemma 7. For any detectable Sybil transmission, there always exists a group of transmis-
sions with size no more than NT , whose received signals could linearly expand (the received
signal of) that transmission.
Proof. Since all Sybil transmissions from a same device fall into a linear subspace of
dimension nT (see Equation A.2 in Section A.2) and there are more than nT detectable Sybil
transmissions by definition, any group of nT + 1 detectable Sybil transmissions are linearly
dependent. In other words, any group of nT (nT < NT ) detectable Sybil transmissions from
the same device could linearly expand a detectable Sybil transmission. 
Corollary 2 and Lemma Lemma 7 indicate that the size of linearly expanding transmis-
sion groups can be a distinguishing feature of Sybil vs. no-Sybil classifications, under a
stricter condition of maximum number of transmitters per device.
Condition 6. NT < b nRNT c
Lemma 8. A transmission is detectable Sybil, if and only if there exists a group of less than
b nRNT c transmissions, whose received signals could linearly expand (the received signal of)
that transmission.
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Proof. It is easy to see this is true under Condition Condition 6, according to Corollary 2
and Lemma Lemma 7. 
Note that undetectable Sybil transmissions may or may not be identified. However, from
the viewpoint of resource testing, these transmissions are not disproportional to the attacking
device’s resources (i.e., transmitter antennas) and therefore benign.
A.4.1 Naive Algorithm
Lemma Lemma 8 leads to a naive Sybil detection algorithm. Produce all possible
combinations of (b nRNT c − 1)-tuples of transmissions and examine them one by one. For a
given tuple, use it to examine all the remaining transmissions; ones that can be linearly
expanded by the current tuple are marked as Sybil.
This algorithm allows us to identify all detectable Sybil transmissions because all possi-
ble combinations of (b nRNT c − 1)-tuples are considered. A direction for future improvements
is to intelligently reduce the possible tuples in consideration while maintaining the same
level of false negative rate.
A.5 Practical Consideration and Future Work
Our current solution assumes complete information about the received signals, i.e., both
the power and phase of the received signal at each receiver of the MIMO antenna. In
practice, we may only know the received power, not the phase. Worse, we may only know
the aggregated power of all receivers if only an aggregated RSSI is exposed. A path of future
work is to relax the current assumption and push the work further to deal with incomplete
information.
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